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NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH A
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN:
A CASE STUDY OF REGIONAL SHOPPING
CENTER LOCATION CONFLICTS IN
LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY
A. DAN TARLOCK*
INTRODUCTION
"Analysis has established that Downtown Lexington is in healthy
condition and that its functions are being performed with reasonable
efficiency and profitability. For the most part, it has maintained a
strong position vis-a-vis competitive developments in the metropolitan
area. The retail function, for example, is still largely centered in the
downtown area as really first-class competition has not developed in
the suburbs. Consumer-oriented office functions have developed at
various points near residential markets, but most of the banking head-
quarters and region-serving office functions are still downtown. While
the suburban motel has become the principal force in the local transi-
ent market, unlike other cities, first-class accommodations are avail-
able and are still being built in the downtown. Overall, the down-
town real estate market is strong and property values have not dedined
as in the central areas of other cities.
"Downtown has reached a crucial point in its development, however,
and the next two to five years may very well determine its role
over the next two decades. The metropolitan market that makes
*Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington. A.B., 1963,
LL.B., 1965 Stanford University. The research for this study was conducted while
the author was assistant professor of law at the University of Kentucky. The
valuable assistance of Mr. Clyde Milton Richardson, Jr., J.D. University of
Kentucky, 1968, in the preparation of this study is gratefully acknowledged.
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it possible to support major retail developments at key suburban
locations and the first regional center will open soon. Local traffic
patterns are being drastically altered by the completion of a cir-
cumferential highway that for the first time will make it possible to
move easily between development sectors without entering the central
area. In combination, these two forces are making it increasingly
attractive and economically feasible to build major facilities in sub-
urban locations to compete with Downtown.
"At the same time, physical environmental conditions in Downtown
itself are making it increasingly unattractive as a place to do business
and increasingly difficult to attract new investments. Many buildings
are obsolete, traffic conditions have markedly worsened in recent
years, and the total image projected by downtown is unfavorable.
Downtown's role in the metropolitan economy of the future will be
largely determined by the ability to alleviate these and other problems
and to create an attracive framework that will generate new private
capital. Most American cities have met these problems too late and
the resulting losses in sales, the building vacancies, the declining prop-
erty values and the inefficient consumer service are well known. These
problems can be avoided in Lexington as prompt and vigorous actions
are initiated to renew its physical plant and to resolve its major prob-
lems."1
This excerpt from a report of the Lexington-Fayette County, Ken-
tucky Planning Commission describes the problems now being faced
by small and medium-size cities which are attempting to balance sub-
urban commercial growth with that of the downtown area.2 Lexing-
ton, Kentucky recently has been faced with this problem. The down-
town has been deteriorating steadily since the end of World War II,
1. City-County Planning Commission of Lexington and Fayette County, An
Analysis of Commercial Activities in Lexington and Fayette County, Kentucky
(1966) (Hereinafter cited as An Analysis of Commercial Activities). Lexington
is located in Fayette County, Kentucky. The city and the county have formed a
joint city-county planning unit pursuant to Ky. REv. STAT. 100.121 (1969) so
that all plans prepared are county-wide. The Planning Commission passes on
recommendations for map amendments for land located in both the county and
the city and the Commission recommendations are forwarded to either the Fayette
County Fiscal Court or the Lexington Board of Commissioners for final approval.
2. The pattern of suburban commercial growth experienced by large cities
after World War II and the Korean War is now being repeated in smaller metro-
politan areas and cities. The history of the post war exodus of commercial facilities
to the suburbs is traced in G. STERNLIEB, THE FUTURE OF THE DOWNTOWN
DEPARTMENT STORE (1962). See generally HoRAcc Land Use Controls in an
Urban Society, 28 RocxY MT. L. LEv. 512 (1956).
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and the first regional shopping center opened in 1966. During this
time, a small urban renewal program was formulated, but before it
could be determined if this initial effort would lead to a comprehen-
sive re-vitalization of the downtown, the Planning Commission was
faced with petitions for three map amendments to permit the con-
struction of three regional shopping centers. 3 This paper is a study
of the decisions taken by the Commission, local legislative bodies and
the judiciary in dealing with these petitions.
These decisions were chosen because they provide a useful vehicle
to evaluate the commonly held assumption that if the administration
of land use controls is more directly related to professional planning
criteria a more rational allocation of land will result.4 They represent
an attempt to use zoning to implement a professionally prepared
community development plan which failed and they were made under
what most planners should consider an ideal decision-making structure.
The Planning Commission had adopted a professionally prepared
land use plan which contained explicit recommendations for a re-
gional shopping center location policy. These recommendations were
formulated on the basis of several lengthy planning studies and were
known and discussed at the time the plan was adopted. The state
legislature had recently adopted a new planning and zoning enabling
act which attempted to assure that map amendments would be granted
only if they were consistent with an adopted community development
plan.5 In spite of all these conditions the planning commission was
3. This paper uses the shopping center classifications formulated by the Urban
Land Institute. A regional shopping center is characterized by the uniform
development of some 400,000 to 1,000,000 gross square feet of floor area with
supporting parking facilities. J. Ross McKEEVER, SHOPPING CENTERS RE-STUDIED
9-10 (Urban Land Institute Technical Bulletin No. 30, 1957). For a discussion
of the function of regional shopping centers in contemporary urban planning see
V. GRUEN, THE HEART OF OUR CITIES (1964).
4. It has been hoped that the more detached perspective of the planner will
make it possible for him to analyze future growth trends in the community and
translate these into a master strategy for the optimum future growth of the com-
munity. Charles Haar in his searching inquiry into the function of the master
plan justified the master plan because "It endeavors to liquidate the caprice of
circumstance and thus provides businessman X, his competitors, the public, and
property owners with a rational framework within which each can pursue his
interests, protected to some extent from the attrition of the unexpected-certainly
oo far as public policy is concerned." C. Haar, The Master Plan: An Inquiry in
Dialogue Form, 25 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 133, 139 (1959).
5. Ky. REv. STAT. Ch. 100 (1969). For a discussion of the legislation see
Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An
Analysis of the 1966 Revision of Ky. Rev. Stat. Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L. J. 556
(1968).
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unable to formulate a set of rational criteria for its decisions and
ultimately abandoned all policies contained in the plans and adopted
a "come-one, come-all" policy.
This article has a subsidiary, yet inseparable purpose, studying the
extent to which adopted plans control the administration of land use
regulations. The value premises incorporated into the plan must be
examined in light of the permissible uses of zoning. The plan at-
tempted to time the entry of regional shopping centers into the
community to protect existing merchants. This is an example of
zoning for the general welfare in the broadest sense of the term, for
it was defined as the exclusion of competition to protect the economic
welfare of the city. Courts have jettisoned the nuisance rationale of
zoning and sanctioned a wide variety of planning techniques designed
to further the general welfare. However, they have generally failed to
articulate new criteria to define the permissible uses of zoning and thus
have encouraged its use for a number of doubtful purposes. One hope
for defining the general welfare with greater precision lies in the use
of adopted plans as a standard to review legislative action. However,
the decisions taken by the Lexington-Fayette County Planning Com-
mission indicate that adopted plans may fail to rationalize the deci-
sion-making process unless courts take an active role in institution-
alizing reliance on them. This can be done by defining with greater
precision the scope of the zoning power, by confining planning studies
to an examination of relevant concerns and by using the plans as a
new standard of judicial review.
BACKGROUND
Lexington is located in the north-central portion of Kentucky. It
is bounded on the northwest by a privately-owned green belt of large
horse farms. Inside the urban area well-planned, tree-lined streets give
way to a mixture of sprawling, unimaginatively designed suburbs,
garish neon strips, and a decaying city core which is uglier than most
downtowns. Prior to 1954 Lexington had a steady but unspectacular
population growth and a highly stratified social structure.0 This
6. A good general history of the early development of Lexington is R. WADE,
THE URBAN FRONTIER (1959). This city's first major industry was hemp but by
1810 it had eight cotton factories, three woolen mills and an oil cloth factory. It
failed to become a major Ohio Valley center because it could not compete with
the river cities of Cincinnati and Louisville but developed a steady economic base
of tobacco, horses, regional retailing and public facilities, such as the University
of Kentucky and a federal narcotics hospital, prior to its current industrial develop-
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changed when a large IBM plant was located in the city. Other light
industries followed with a resulting economic boom which continues
today.7 This boom had several consequences for the regional shopping
center controversies. Increased population generated the demand for
new commercial facilities. The previous community social structure
was characterized by polarization between upper and lower income
groups and the absence of a substantial middle class. Existing com-
mercial facilities were geared to either upper or lower income groups,
and two large department stores, supporting specialty shops, and
smaller lower priced department stores met the community's retail de-
mands. These facilities and stores were inadequate to meet the de-
mands of the large influx of skilled workers, managerial personnel,
and professional people brought in by the new industries, service
facilities and the expansion of the University of Kentucky. Shoppers
voiced frequent complaints about the limited merchandise mix and
the slow response of the established downtown merchants to new
demands. Since the regional shopping center which opened in 1966
is geared primarily to the lower middle income groups the demand
for new retail facilities for middle-middle and upper-middle income
groups remained unfilled at the time the three petitions were filed.8
The city and county began planning operations in 1928, although
a professional staff was not acquired until 1961. Several master plans
prepared by nationally known planners9 were generally ignored by the
planning commission and the city, largely because they were too con-
servative in projection of population growth. For purposes of this
study, the most important plan was a 1958 supplement to an earlier
master plan prepared by the Cincinnati firm of Ladislas Segoe.10 This
supplement was much more successful than earlier efforts and formed
the basis for many of the plans subsequently adopted by the commis-
sion.
ment. City-County Planning Commission of Lexington and Fayette County, A
Growing Community 9 (1967).
7. Manufacturing employment increased 180% between 1950 and 1964. City-
County Planning Commission of Lexington and Fayette County, A Growing Com-
munity 20 (1967).
8. Federated Department Stores emphasized that their store would represent
the middle and upper price lines. Transcript of Hearing, City-County Commis-
sion, 28 (June 23, 1967) (Hereinafter referred to as Hearing of June 23, 1967).
9. See, e.g., City Planning and Zoning Commission, Comprehensive Plan of
Lexington, Kentucky and Environs (1931).
10. City-County Planning Commission of Lexington and Fayette County, Master
Plan Supplement-1958. This supplement amended L. Segoe, Master Plan for
Lexington and Fayette County (1950).
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The 1958 Supplement was the first plan to propose specific locations
for categories of land use and to face the problem of downtown-
suburban commercial competiton. It classified the downtown as a
regional shopping center and concluded that the chances of the con-
tinued successful operation of both the downtown commercial area
and a new regional shopping center were "very poor." This recom-
mendation, with its built-in protectionism, was supported by down-
town interests and was incorporated into the 1962 interim and final
land use plan. It also significantly influenced shopping center location
policy of the professional planning staff.- In this author's opinion
the unfortunate consequence of this recommendation was continual
reliance by many influential persons in the community on protection,
rather than development-oriented, solutions to an economically
healthy downtown. Therefore, when the commission had to confront
the problems presented by the three petitions for regional shopping
centers, it found difficulty in articulating any reasons for its actions
and ultimately capitulated to pressures for an unrestrained develop-
ment policy.
In 1967 the Commission adopted a land use plan which contained
a detailed regional shopping center location policy.12 Much of this
policy was based on a study of commercial activities in Lexington and
Fayette County completed the previous year. The first regional shop-
ping center opened in 1966, but this was the only instance in which
the planning staff and the commission deviated from their policy of
permiting no regional shopping centers in addition to the downtown.
They never abandoned the assumption that the downtown needed to
be protected, although they recognized that the growth between 1962
and the present was again in excess of its original projection and in-
dicated a demand for new commercial facilities. In their plans they
sought to protect the downtown by recommending that a regional
shopping center should be developed only when there was a sufficient
economic base to support it, and that existing commercial establish-
ments be allowed to maintain their current sales revenues. 13 The
11. A study conducted by one of my land use planning students found that the
staff consistently relied on the Segoe conclusion in recommending against rezoning
to permit the development of regional shopping centers between 1962 and 1966.
C. Care, The Lexington Central Business District: Plans and Progress (mimeo in
Lexington, Kentucky 1968).
12. City-County Planning Commission, Lexington and Fayette County, A
Plan For Land Use (1967) (Hereinafter referred to as A Plan for Land Use).
13. An Analysis of Commercial Activities at 105-110.
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data and assumptions relied on in formulating this recommendation
merit extended analysis.
The commercial activities study considered three alternatives for
regulating future commercial growth: (1) a concentrated, (2) a bal-
anced and (3) a dispersed retail system. The first would involve a
policy of denying all applications for suburban retail regional shop-
ping centers, the second would attempt to time their development,
and the third would place no restrictions on their development. The
first was rejected for the very practical reason that "it would be ex-
tremely difficult to maintain the restrictive zoning policies required
for implementation" and "moreover, there is a serious question that
the interest of the public can best be served in terms of convenience
in shopping alternatives."114 The third was rejected because it "rep-
resents the defeatist, no action program that would result in the
emasculation of the downtown complex which should be the heart of
the metropolitan retail system"1 5 and "because it is unlikely that the
population would be best served by this system as alternative shop-
ping facilities outside the region would be sought."16 There was no
effort to reconcile the seemingly inconsistent reasons given for the
rejection of the first and third alternatives. The rejection of the first
alternative seems premised on the assumption that the downtown
will not respond to new market demands, and the rejection of the
third alternative seems partially based on the assumption that sub-
urban regional shopping centers will not respond to the same de-
mands. Not surprisingly, the study recommended that the commission
adopt a balanced system of retail facilities. The study gave a cryptic
reason for the recommendation: "It is not so much a compromise as
a system which recognizes the realities and necessities of modern urban
development."' 7 The study did not elaborate further on the need to
protect the downtown but instead emphasized that the policy of timed
shopping center development must be combined with "a vigorous
revitalization program for the downtown."1s The study did not specify
the precise program which should be implemented in conjunction
with the timed development policy, but one implication which can
be drawn is that the timed development policy is valid only in the
context of the city's urban renewal program and related private efforts.
14. Id. at 61-65.
15. Id. at 64-65.
16. Id. at 65.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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This point was not extensively discussed during the hearings on the
three regional shopping center map amendment petitions but will
be more fully analyzed later in this article.
The commercial activities study was prepared by the well-known
consulting firm of Hammer, Green, Syler Associates, Washington,
D. C. and local assistance was provided by the Heart of the City Com-
mittee,--a local businessman's booster group. The study is a tradi-
tional planning statistical analysis and relies primarily on population,
sales and income data. No attempt was made to gauge consumer re-
action to existing downtown stores or to anticipate the demand for
quality differentials among various classes of retail goods. The study
divided the community's market area into three regions: (1) the
primary market area, Fayette County; (2) the secondary market-
seven surrounding counties in various stages of transition from agri-
cultural to light industrial based economies; and (3) the tertiary
market-thirty-nine rural middle-Kentucky counties including much
of the hard-core poverty area of Appalachia.19 The following chart
gives the available population and retail shopping expenditures figures
and projections on which the timing policy was based: 20
1963 TOTAL PERCENT 1980
EXPENDITURES EXPENDED PROJECTED
NUm3ER OF FOR IN TOTAL
MARKET AREA FAMILIES MERCHANDISE LEXINGTON EXPENDITURES
1. Primary 53,000 $64,300,000 85% $121,656,000
2. Secondary 45,000 $55,000,000 26% $ 72,298,000
3. Tertiary (not given) $72,466,000 12% projected Lexington
expenditures esti-
mated to range from
$15,201,000 to
$17,030,000
The study projected an increase of 44 million dollars in shopper ex-
penditures between 1963 and 1980 and a split between the downtown
and the suburbs in the ratio of 55%/45%, providing a revitalization
program was undertaken. The study calculated that each square foot
of retail space would generate 45 dollars worth of sales and concluded
that the 985,000 additional square feet could be absorbed into the
19. Id. at 107.
20. Id. at 58-61.
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community by 1980 without unduly curtailing existing retail sales.21
The study emphasized that these figures do "not mean that a major
new facility could not compete successfully in the market before that
date; it means only that in such an event the market is likely to be
oversaturated and that the older non-competitive facilities will be
seriously affected."2 2 It then examined the areas of the city which
were experiencing the greatest growth, fixed the general location of
the centers accordingly, and concluded by recommending that the
commission allow only one center in the southeast sector by the early
1970's and one in the northern sector by 1980.23 (See Map.) No re-
gional centers for other geographical areas of the community were
recommended.
A major stake in the shopping center market was the estimated
$10,000,000 a year flowing out of the Lexington area most of this
probably going to the larger metropolitan areas of Louisville and Cin-
cinnati, each about 75 minutes from Lexington via interstate high-
ways.2 4 It was hoped that a regional center with a large regional or
national department store catering to the unsatisfied middle and
upper-middle class market could retain most of this slippage, which
would never be regained by the downtown.
The timing policy was incorporated into the city-county land use
plan. The plan recommended that several large tracts of land be re-
served for the future development of a regional shopping center. It
did not indicate the precise location of the first center to be built,
but did indicate the general geographical area of the city in which
the shopping center should be located, suggesting three alternative
sites.25 The effect of the plan was to force the commission to choose
between one of the three sites. The plan also specified several other
site and location criteria designed to minimize potential friction be-
tween the shopping center and competing land uses. It recommended
that the centers have easy access to two major arterials serving the
tributary trade area, that strip development be avoided, that buffering
21. Id. at 107-108.
22. Id. at 108.
23. Id. at 109-110.
24. Id. at 58. Estimates of the amount of slippage in studies may for private
retail stores run much higher. A study prepared for Sears & Roebuck, which
had for years been trying to break out of the downtown, put the figure at
$87 million. First Research Corporation, Economic and Market Analysis, Proposed
Regional Shopping Center and Sears Store, Lexington, Kentucky (March, 1964).
25. A Plan For Land Use at 95.
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be implemented and that the regional centers be placed three to four
miles apart "in order to maintain a serviceable market area." 20 This
reflects the prevailing belief among developers that if the centers are
too close together they will mutually suffer because of competition.27
The recommendations contain several designed criteria: maintenance
of natural features; development of a unified, functional shopping
unit; and a "congenial shopping atmosphere." The study ended with
a plea for "a designed quality that distinguished the center from a
commercial area that happened."2s
The timing policy ran into trouble from its inception because the
study was too conservative in its population projections. It recom-
mended that the first regional shopping center be developed be-
tween 1970 and 1975, on the basis of a projected population base of
175,000. 21 This, combined with the population of the secondary
market, would give the area the second hundred thousand population
most planners consider necessary to support an additional regional
shopping center.30 However, the data presented by the three appli-
cants for map amendments indicated that by 1967, Lexington had
equalled, if not exceeded, the 1967 projection.3 ' This gave the three
developers the wedge they needed to counter objections raised by the
commission that approval of any petition was premature in view of
their adopted plan. Developers could respond that immediate devel-
opment was justified according to the population projections on which
the timing policy was based, and that such development was consistent
with the comprehensive plan.
PLANNING STRUCTURE IN KENTUCKY
In Kentucky a planning commission must be formed before a city
or county can engage in planning and the regulation of land use.
26. Id. at 92.
27. C. GRUEN and N. GRUEN, STORE LOCATION AND CUSTOMER BEHAVIOR, A
BEEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO OPTIMUM STORE LOCATION (Urban Land Institute
Technical Bulletin No. 56, 1966).
28. A Plan For Land Use, Supra note 25 at 92.
29. A Growing Community, Supra note 6 at 4.
30. See H. GROSSMAN, Survey and Analysis of Shopping Centers in a Suburban
County, Montgomery County Planning Commission, Norristown, Pennsylvania
MCPC 63-71, 22 (1963).
31. Homer Hoyt Associates, Market Survey of Proposed Regional Shopping
Center at Lakeview, Lexington, Kentucky Metropolitan Area 3-4 (April 1967).
The conclusion was based on FHA figures for the number of dwelling units in
Fayette County.
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Lexington and Fayette County have a joint city-county planning com-
mission of eight members. At the time of this study, the Commission
was operating under the 1966 revision of the state enabling legisla-
tion.- Two statutory features were significant: the preparation and
adoption of a comprehensive plan is required; and subsequent map
amendments must be consistent with the plan unless certain excep-
tions apply.3 3 Section 100.213 of the statute provides:
Before any map amendment is granted, the planning commission
or the legislative body or fiscal court must find that the map
amendment is in agreement with the community's comprehensive
F lan, or, in the absence of such a finding, that one or more of the
ollowing apply and such finding shall be recorded in the minutes
and records of the planning commission and the legislative body
or fiscal court.
(1) That the original zoning classification given to the property
was inappropriate or improper.
(2) That there have been major changes of an economic, phys-
ical or social nature within the area involved which were not an-
ticipated in the community's comprehensive plan and which have
substantially altered the basic character of such area.
The enabling legislation's adoption of the "change or mistake" 3'
rule appears to have been intended to restrict the power of planning
commissions and local legislative bodies to grant map amendments.
The Court of Appeals had previously held that "a reconsideration or
re-examination of the conditions in any area of the city may justify
a change in the zoning ordinance as it affects that area even though
there has been no change of conditions in the area since the adoption
of the original ordinance."' 5
The enabling legislation abandons Bassett's narrow conception of
the function of the master plan as reflected in the Standard Planning
32. Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 100.111 - .191 (1969).
33. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §1 100.183, 100.213 (1969).
34. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100.213 (Baldwin Supp. 1969).
35. Shemwell v. Speck, 265 S.W.2d 468, 470 (Ky. 1954). See also Louisville
Timber and Wooden Products Co. v. City of Beachwood Village, 376 S.W.2d
690 (Ky. 1964), where city board of trustees was not required to follow the
recommendation of planning commission.
The section also gave the Commission the power to veto any map amendment.
A local circuit court held that both the planning commission and the local
legislative body had to make the requisite findings in order for a map amendment
to be valid. The double veto was eliminated during the 1968 session of the legisla-
ture. See TARLOCIK, A Comment on the 1968 Amendments to Kentucky Planning
and Land Use Controls Enabling Legislation, 57 Ky. L. J. 83 (1968).
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Act.36 The comprehensive plan is not advisory in Kentucky, but it is
binding on the commission. 37 It is a series of public documents separate
from the zoning map.38 It is not merely a land use map;39 but must
contain a "statement of goals and objectives, principles, policies, and
standards, which shall serve as a guide for the physical development
and economic and social well-being of the planning unit,"40 as well
as land use, transportation and community facilities plans.41 The land
use plan serves to allocate land for community needs "as far into the
future as it is reasonable to foresee." Thus, the plan should not cor-
respond to the zoning map when it is adopted but should serve as a
set of criteria for the commission to follow in denying or granting
map amendments. 42
The legislation does not define the legal status of a land use pro-
jection incorporated into the comprehensive plan on the individual
property owner. It is unlikely that the legislature intended a land
use projection to be an encumbrance for the purpose of determining
marketability of title. But, it does appear that the plan is intended
to influence private land use decisions. Section 213 obligates the com-
mission to follow the plan unless the two defined exceptions apply.
36. See BASSETT, et. al., Model Laws for Planning Cities, Counties, and States,
7 HARVARD CITY PLANNING STUDIES 40 (1935). See generally E. BASSETT, THE
MASTER PLAN (1938).
37. Early lawyer-planners assigned an advisory function to the Master Plan
because they wished to keep planning above city politics and they were afraid
that the concept of planning would not be accepted if the plan were construed
as an encumbrance on property. See A. BETTMAN, City and Regional Planning
Papers, 13 HARVARD CITY PLANNING STUDIES XIII 23-43 (1946).
38. Ky. REV. STAT. § 100.201 (1969) authorizes the enactment of a zoning
ordinance after adoption of "at least the objectives of the land use plan elements."
The drafters appear to have intended to require both adoption of a statement of
goals and objectives and the land use plan, for legislation was introduced during
the 1968 session of the General Assembly to change the "of" to "and." Senate
Bill No. 383 (1968).
39. For a modem statement on the nature and function of the master plan
see H. Pomeroy, Some Thoughts on the Master Plan, Westchester County, New
York, Department of Planning (1951).
40. Ky. REV. STAT. § 100.187 (1969). Section 100.191 specifies the research
process which must be undertaken in its preparation of the plan to insure that it
will be oriented toward the future. Ky. REV. STAT. § 100.191 (1969).
41. Ky. REV. STAT. § 100.187 (1969).
42. See Kozsenik v. Montgomery Township, 24 N. J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957);
Haar, In Accordance With A Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154
(1955). Others have interpreted the comprehensive plan to require only that
the zoning power be exercised reasonably. Walus v. Millington, 49 Misc. 2d 104,
266 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Cianciarulo v. Tarro, 92 R.I. 352, 168
A.2d 719 (1961). See also Shelton v. City of Bellevue, 73 Wash. 2d 28, 435 P.2d
949 (1968).
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This should operate to encourage private individuals to develop their
property in a manner consistent with the plan for the expectation of
receiving a map amendment for a use inconsistent with the plan has
been substantially decreased compared to the previous law.
The definition of the comprehensive plan contained in the enabling
legislation reflects many of the reforms proposed by academic planners
such as Charles Haar43 and John Reps.41 The existing planning proc-
ess has been much criticized because it produces a static document,
or series of documents, which are not useful in resolving future land
use conflicts.45 Professor Haar has argued: "It is only as a series of
statements and precepts, representing community choice and decision
as to space needs of various activities and interrelationships of land
uses, that the master plan can effectively fulfill its role as a guide to
regulatory action."6 In his 1964 Pomeroy Memorial Lecture, Pro-
fessor Reps elaborated Haar's concept of the comprehensive plan as
an "impermanent constitution," arguing that the plan should be
adopted by the legislative body and "should show generalized pro-
posed future land uses, circulation systems, population density pat-
terns, and community facilities."' T After adoption of the plan, it
would be reviewed by a state-wide agency and thereafter "all discre-
tionary review of development proposals would be guided by this plan.
Appeals from local decisions could be taken to the state review agency.
Further appeals to courts would be permitted only on matters of
procedure or on the scope of statutory power, not on matters of sub-
stance." 1, Kentucky has adopted Haar's conception of the compre-
hensive plan, but has not adopted all of Reps's suggestions for the
administration of land use controls pursuant to the plan. There is
no state-wide agency to review planning decisions, and Reps's proposal
for compensation when development of an individual parcel is severely
restricted has not been adopted.49 If adopted plans are to function
as a meaningful limitation on the discretion of planning commissions
43. Haar, In Accordance With A Comprehensive Plan, supra note 42 at 1170-
1175.
44. See REPS, Pomeroy Memorial Lecture: Requiem For Zoning, PLANNING
1964 56, 60-61.
45. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, PROBLEMS 01 ZONING
AND LAND-USE REGULATION: RESEARcH REPORT No. 2, 28-29 (1968).
46. Haar, In Accordance With A Comprehensive Plan, supra note 42 at 1174-
75.
47. Reps, Requiem For Zoning, supra note 44 at 62.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 63.
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and local legislative bodies in Kentucky the courts must take an active
role in enforcing compliance with them.
Traditionally the Court of Appeals has not relied on adopted land
use plan as a standard for judicial review. It has adhered to the po-
sition that map amendments are legislative decisions and that judicial
review should be concerned only with the question of arbitrariness.
In American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County
Planning and Zoning Comm., o0 the court confined arbitrariness to
three grounds: (1) action in excess of granted powers; (2) lack of
procedural due process; and (3) lack of substantial evidentiary sup-
port. The court defers to the judgment of the local legislative body
so long as it is reasonable. The spot zoning rationale has been widely
used to invalidate map amendments which appeared to have been
granted solely for the convenience of the applicant, but apart from
this limitation the court has generally been tolerant of the decisions
taken by local legislative bodies.51
The courts have been unable to formulate meaningful criteria for
judicial review because for the most part they have been reviewing
ad hoe map amendments based on plans, if any existed, which did
little more than describe the existing allocation of land in the
community and spell-out some highly generalized development cri-
teria. 52 However, as reliance on planning studies which seek to al-
locate land in advance of the need for the use increases, it is possible
that the courts will begin to use the comprehensive plan envisioned
in the 1966 enabling legislation as a new standard for judicial review.
Arbitrariness could be redefined to mean failure to conform to the
plan rather than a general inquiry into whether there is a rational
basis for the decision. There has been some movement in this di-
rection in Kentucky.
In Fritts v. City of Ashland,53 the Court invalidated rezoning for
light industry of a four-acre tract in the center of a stable residential
district. The major reason for the zone change was the threat by the
factory owner to leave the city. The Court characterized the case as
one of spot zoning and relied on the traditional equal protection ra-
tionale, but significantly emphasized that the change was made with-
out regard to any coordinated plan. The Court warned: "[It] is hoped
50. 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964).
51. See Fritts v. City of Ashland, 348 S.W.2d 712 (Ky. 1961); Hodge v.
Luckett, 357 S.W.2d 303 (Ky. 1962).
52. See T. KENT, JR., THE URBAN GENERAL PLAN 40 (1964).
53. 348 S.W.2d 712 (Ky. 1961).
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that in the future zoning authorities will give recognition to the fact
that an essential feature of zoning is planning."54 Ward v. Knippen-
berg,55 approved a shopping center location designated in the 1958
land use plan although the 1962 land use plan designated a different
site. The Court rejected the argument that the map amendment was
invalid because it was not in accordance with the 1962 interim land
use plan:
With respect to the first propositon, it seems clear that a zoning
agency is not bound to follow every detail of a land use plan.
As we understand it, such a plan is simply a basic scheme gen-
erally outlining planning and zoning objectives in an extensive
area. It is in no sense a final plan and is continually subject to
modification in the light of actual land use development. It serves
as a guide rather than a strait-jacket. In fact the Commission
recommended, and the Fiscal Court adopted, the shopping center
location in exactly the same spot where it was shown on the
1957 land use plan. We know of no reason why the Commission
could not, in the light of the latest developments, decide which
of two different locations in the same subdivision area would best
serve immediate requirements. 8
A broad reading of the language would indicate that the Court of
Appeals is unwilling to consider comprehensive plans binding on the
commission and will not use them as a standard of judicial review.
However, a narrow reading of the opinion suggests only that the Com-
mission need not locate uses at the precise location designated in the
plan provided the plan did allocate land for the use proximate to its
ultimate location. The function of the court would be to examine
the objectives of the plan to determine the types of use conflicts it
sought to avoid and the level of use it attemped to encourage. If the
map amendment would not upset the basic projected land use scheme,
it could be found consistent with the comprehensive plan. Under this
narrow interpretation, Ward would not preclude use of the compre-
hensive plan to invalidate a map amendment for a new use if no
land had been allocated for it in the general area.
ADOPTION OF THE LEXINGTON-FAYETTE COUNTY LAND USE PLAN
The members of the City-County Planning Commission can be
broken into three categories: Two members are city and county em-
ployees and generally reflect the thinking of city and county officials;
four are local business men and reflect what Sidney Willhelm has
54. Id. at 715.
55. 416 S.W.2d 746 (Ky. 1967).
56. Id. at 748.
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categorized as "economic values"-that land use control should be
dictated by the prevailing market situation. 0a The last two members
are employed by national companies, not dependent upon the local
community for their livelihood, and represent what has been termed
a collective value orientation 5 and make a conscious effort to formu-
late a set of planning criteria which can be applied to an immediate
controversy.
Planning-oriented legislation will be of limited utility unless the com-
mission members perceive the plans adopted as a limitation on their
discretion. They must be willing to formulate a definition of the
public interest which can be applied to the controversies they face
instead of acting merely as brokers between the developer and various
city and county departments. It is difficult, however, for most com-
mission members to transcend their broker role unless they are rein-
forced by influential segments of the community: For example, the
news media or those whom Robert Dahl has categorized as the eco-
nomic notables.58 Planning interest among these groups is conspic-
uously lacking in Lexington. The one individual with sufficient fi-
nancial resources to influence the development of the community has
been content to keep his representative on the commission so that
it does not interfere with his land development operations, while
he engages in a prolonged status and financial struggle with the tra-
ditional establishment. The most important news media in the com-
munity are the two newspapers, jointly managed and controlled by a
series of interlocking trusts. Unlike the nearby Louisvillc Courier-
Journal, which takes a keen interest in the development of its com-
munity, the two Lexington papers follow the policy that whatever
brings in more advertising space must be good for the entire com-
munity. The Courier-Journal has a limited circulation in Lexington
but refuses to compete with the two local newspapers so that there is
no effective "community conscience" examining commission action,
56a. S. WILLHELM, URBAN ZONING AND LAND USE THEORY 95-96 (1962). In
this instance the existence of economic values are closely correlated to individual-
istic and present time value orientations. Id. at 120-122 and 145-156.
This group basically conceived their role to be that of brokers between the
public and the various city and county departments, since the Commission spends
approximately 80 percent of its time helping people conform their applications to
local ordinances.
57. S. WILLEXELM, URBAN ZONING AND LAND UsE THEORY 118 (1962).
In many respects these two are the most influential members of the Commission
because their arguments are generally better reasoned.
58. R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEaioCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMiERICAN CITY
(1961).
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except for one citizen watch-dog group which has limited public sup-
port.59
The land use plan was adopted on March 2, 1967 after extensive
hearings. The hearings are designed to serve several functions: They
can generate public support for the plan; they can expose basic weak-
nesses in underlying assumptions; and they help educate commission
members, lawyers, and developers about the plan's purpose and pro-
jected role in the resolution of future controversies. The educational
function is important because the plan will be effective only if mem-
bers of the commission perceive it as a limitation on their discretion
and only if lawyers see it as a set of criteria which serve to structure
the consideration of their client's petition. In light of their later be-
havior, it is hard to gauge the extent to which members of the com-
mission perceived the regional shopping center recommendations as
precluding them from approving more than one shopping center
amendment. However, it is clear that they were aware of the con-
sequences of the plan's adoption on expected subsequent petitions
from map amendments for the construction of regional centers. It is
also clear that the involved lawyers were sufficiently concerned to at-
tempt to prevent the plan's adoption and, following its adoption, to
obtain assurance from the members of the Commission that they would
not follow the plan. Attorneys for the owner of a site not included in
the plan urged that the plan not be adopted because "in view of
Kentucky legislation it would freeze the community's possible growth
for the next fifteen years." 60 Thus, the attorneys must have recognized
that adoption of the plan would theoretically preclude consideration
of their client's site unless they could show that the assumptions on
which the plan was based were erroneous or involved zoning action
in excess of statutory authority. Considerable behind-the-scenes bar-
gaining was apparently going on, and some attorneys must have
thought they could persuade individual commission members not to
take the plan seriously.61 Thus, while the commission was in theory
59. The Citizens Association for Planning monitors commission hearings and
occasionally appears in court to challenge the commission or the city or county.
For example, in 1966 the commission recommended that the fiscal court deny
a map amendment for an industrial park in the county on the grounds that it
was within the agricultural service area and thus inconsistent with the land use
plan. The fiscal court approved the amendment and the Citizens Association for
Planning brought suit against the fiscal court. The commission ultimately joined
as a party plaintiff.
60. Hearings Before City-County Planning Commission, at 3 (Dec. 6, 1966).
61. During later map amendment hearings, the attorneys for the aforementioned
non-included side argued that the side was entitled equal consideration with the
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LOCATION OF REGIONAL SHOPPING
CENTER PETITIONS IN LEXINGTON-
FAYETTE COUNTY, KENTUCKY
NICHOLASVILLE
PIKE
included side because "they were told that the land use plan would not preclude
consideration of their property." In response, an indignant commission member
replied that he "personally had given no commitment not to consider the land
use plan at the hearing." Transcript of Lexington-Fayette County Planning Com-
mission (Hereinafter referred to as Hearing of August 10, 1967) (August 10, 1967).
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operating under a plan which would restrict its alternatives to three
sites, the plan was not so rigidly viewed by some-perhaps the ma-
jority-of the commission members as their official statements reveal.
One member stated to this author that the commission has always
adhered to the philosophy that any person with a corner lot and
$15,000 ought to have a go at developing it. All developers clearly
met with this criteria.
The land use plan's recommendation for the timed development of
regional shopping centers was under severe strain even before the plan
was adopted. By January 20, 1967, the commission had before it peti-
tions for three regional shopping centers, and each applicant an-
nounced his intention of developing the property immediately if the
map amendments were granted. Thus, the commission's decisions
would make or break this part of the land use plan and give a good
indication of how the commission would handle other "hard" contro-
versies in the future.
Each of the applicants applied for a map amendment which would
dassify the property as a planned shopping center district. The fol-
lowing chart indicates the names of the applicants and the nature of
their zoning petitions. The sites can be noted on the map on the
opposite page.
APPLICANT STATUS OF PROPERTY ACREAGE
PRIoR TO REQUEST
FOR REZONING
Site No. I Headley Estates Residential
Planned Shopping
Center District 2  80.34
Site No. 2 John Shillito Agricultural
Heavy industry 5  10.96
Site No. 3 Lakeview Estates Agricultural 64.75
Apartments 56.24
Agricultural 4.00
Apartments 54.00
Planned Shopping
Center 19.50
Light Industrial' 4  1.25
62. This was the largest undeveloped tract in the central section of the city.
The property to the north was being used for a golf course and a motel but was
zomed for single family residences as was the property to the south. To the west
is a developed subdivision. The property to the east contains a hospital and a
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The Headley site was not recommended for a shopping center in
the land use plan primarily because to do so would have violated the
planning commission's location criteria, as the site was one mile from
the community's existing suburban regional shopping center which
opened in 1966. In addition, access was poor. The owners, however,
had several positive factors in their favor. The property was one of the
last of the old Lexington estates to be subdivided, and the fact that it
represented "old money" meant a great deal. Further, one of the
principal tenants was to be Sears & Roebuck. Sears, currently occupy-
ing obsolete facilities downtown, had been trying to move to the
suburbs for several years without success. Local people were becoming
concerned about incurring the displeasure of this large chain. How-
ever, a petition to rezone this site for a shopping center had been
denied in 1964, a fact that would ultimately prove fatal to this de-
veloper.
The principal force behind the Shillito site was outside money-the
Federated Department Stores of Cincinnati, a national retailing firm.
This site was located outside the city at the time the petition was filed
and presented problems of adequate urban services and access. The
petitioners, however, were willing to become annexed to the city to
provide urban services, and highway improvements were scheduled to
take care of the access problem.
The Lakeview site was held by a local but "new money" land de-
velopment syndicate. The planned shopping center was part of a
larger complex which would include multi-unit residential dwellings
and professional offices. This site was the closest to downtown and was
the most easily accessible from a planned beltline and from the inter-
duplex district. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE COUNTY CITY-COUNTY PLANNING COMMIS-
SION, ZONING COMMITTEE REPORT OF PETITION FOR ZONING MAP AMENDMENT
M.A.R. 66-46 (June 1, 1967).
63. This property was bounded on the north and west by a tobacco ware-
house zoned for heavy industry. To the east are single family residence sub-
divisions and the property to the south is zoned for agricultural use. LEXINGTON-
FAYETTE COUNTY CITY-COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION, ZONING COMMITTEE
RLEPORT ON PETITION FOR ZONING MAP AMENDMENTS M.A.R. 67-10 (February
7, 1967).
64. This property is located on the southern fringe of the city's prime residen-
tial district. The surrounding property was vacant and Lakeview Estates, which
owned most of it, planned to develop the tract as a unified commercial, professional
office and residential center; thus not all requested map amendments were for a
planned shopping center district. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE COUNTY CITY-CouNTY
PLANNING COMMISSION, ZONING COMMITTEE REPORT ON PETITION FOR ZONING
MAP AMENDMENT M.A.R. 67-12 (March 7, 1967).
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state highway system. The syndicate refused to divulge the identities
of major possible retail tenants.
The planning commission held four hearings on the three petitions.
The first was held on April 20, 1967 and theoretically was confined to
the John Shillito petition, which was denied by a 5 to 3 vote. All the
applicants were heard at a second hearing on June 23. After the
second hearing, the commissioners deferred judgment until the third
hearing, which was held on July 27. At this hearing the Headley
Estates petition was approved and the other two denied. These
actions prompted such a reaction from the losing parties and some
members of the commission that a fourth hearing was held on August
10, 1967 to assign reasons for the decisions reached at the previous
hearing. Ultimately, both the Lakeview and the Shillito applications
were approved, while the Headley amendment was invalidated in a
court suit.
COMMIssION RESOLUTION OF THE CONTROVERSY
In this section I summarize the four hearings. My objective is to
determine the extent to which the existence of a comprehensive plan
functioned to structure the arguments presented to the commission
and the principles they followed in reaching their decisions. I will
first analyze the Lexington planned shopping center ordinance, sum-
marize and evaluate the arguments offered by the three petitioners at
the first two hearings, and then discuss the reasons offered by the com-
missioners at the last two hearings for their decisions.
A. THE LEXINGTON-FAYETTE COUNTY PLANNED
SHOPPING CENTER ORDINANCE
The Lexington-Fayette County zoning ordinance contains a special
use classification for integrated shopping centers. Section 20-42 permits
the establishment of a B-lP or planned shopping center district. An
applicant desiring to develop a regional or other planned shopping
center must comply with the requirements of Section 20-42 and demon-
strate that his property, if it is not already zoned for commercial use,
is suitable for B-1 or neigborhood business use. Section 20-42 was con-
fusing because none of the lawyers was able to determine what he had
to do, pursuant to the section, to obtain a favorable recommendation
on his rezoning request. The statement of purpose, which appears in
Appendix A, is the origin of this confusion. It attempts to state a
general shopping center policy but is rendered meaningless by its
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contradictory objectives. It begins with the statement that "It is not
intended, nor would it be proper to forestall additional business zon-
ing simply to prevent competition...." but goes on to enunciate an
extremely restrictive development policy. The ordinance appears to
give the Commission the power to license shopping centers on a broad
public interest standard. They can consider the impact of the pro-
posed shopping center on the existing community retail market in
addition to its impact on surrounding land use and traffic patterns.05
The ordinance also provides a set of location criteria60 designed
to avoid traffic congestion, and a set of minimum design standards,
e.g., a two and one-half story height restriction, a 1:4 building to land
ratio, and a requirement for three square feet of off-street parking for
every square foot of floor space. The most important feature of the
ordinance is the requirement of preliminary and final development
plans. The preliminary plan must show the general layout of the
buildings and their approximate total gross floor areas, ingress and
egress, and the need for the proposed center at the proposed location.
If the Planning Commission approves the plan, it holds a public hear-
ing on the map amendment. If it is approved, the applicant has sixty
days to submit a final development plan. If the Commission approves
this, its recommendation of approval will be forwarded to the city
council or fiscal court.
Zoning ordinances, designed to give planning commissions detailed
control over large-tract development, give courts a great deal of
trouble, and Kentucky is no exception. An earlier Lexington planned
shopping center ordinance was declared ultra vires in Pierson Trapp
Co. v. Peak67 because: "Nowhere in the field of zoning law do we
find any indication that the zoning authority may establish a zone or
district that is limited to only one particular use."68 The ordinance
also raised serious equal protection problems because it applied only
to an applicant seeking rezoning from residential to commercial use,
rather than to an applicant who desired to construct a shopping
center in an area already zoned for commercial use. Section 20-42
applies to all applicants desiring to construct a shopping center re-
gardless of the classification of the property at the time they apply for
65. See APPENDIX A infra.
66. Lexington and Fayette County, Ky. Zoning Ordinance Resolution, § 20-42
(1966).
67. 340 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1960).
68. Id. at 459.
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a B-1P classification. The 1966 enabling legislation permits the estab-
lishment of special purpose districts and specifically "planned busi-
ness districts," eliminating statutory objections voiced in Pierson
Trapp.9 Ordinances which require a development plan as a pre-
requisite to approval also are challenged on the grounds that they
constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative functions to adminis-
trative bodies. Section 20-42 should contain sufficient standards to
overcome the delegation attack, and Kentucky has adopted the Davis
view that the courts will not require precise standards when power is
delegated, so long as the applicant's right to procedural due process
is protected.70
B. POSITION OF PETITIONERS
The following tables are a summary of the arguments advanced in
favor of and against each of the petitions. Many of the arguments are
found in the typical zoning hearing. I have seen no need to elaborate,
but have chosen to concentrate on those arguments which link the
petitions with the objectives of the comprehensive plan.
ARGUMENTS IN FAvOR OF PETITION
Petitioner
1. John Shillito
Argument
The shopping center would be a unified development and would
be consistent with the zoning policy of preventing unattractive
strip developments. The site was near the intersection of a major
radial and circumferential thoroughfare.
The shopping center is in the immediate area of one of the three
alternative sites designated by the land use plan. The center was
consistent with the timing policy of the comprehensive use plan
because it would not be opened until 1972.
Market studies were favorable. The center would recapture some
of the retail slippage going to Cincinnati and Louisville. They
had widespread support among citizens and businessmen.
69. Ky. Ray. STAT. § 100.203 (1) (e) (1969).
70. Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of Northern Kentucky, Inc., 352 S.W.2d
203 (Ky. 1961).
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
Petitioner
2. Headley Estates
Argument
The Headley family had a long association with Lexington and
had made great contributions to the community.
They had an "understanding" that adoption of the land use plan
would not affect consideration of their petition.
They had a major client, Sears & Roebuck.
Petitioner
3. Lakeview Estates
Argument
The site chosen was superior because the use patterns of the
adjoining lands were established and stable.
Market surveys indicated that they would enjoy some $10 million
additional sales as compared to the Shillito site.
Access was better than it was at the Shillito site.
The Lakeview site was complementary with downtown because
of its direct access out Main Street.
The Lakeview site would be the cheapest to the city because
urban services were already extended and no widening of streets
would be required to reduce traffic congestion.
Attorneys for Lakeview Estates and John Shillito agreed that the
comprehensive plan required the Commission to choose one of three
alternative sites and that only one map amendment would be granted.
John Shillito had the most difficulty because the planning commis-
sion staff recommended that this petition be denied. Throughout the
hearings the staff played a limited role, but their reasons for denial
did serve to structure much of John Shillito's argument. The staff first
argued that development of the Shillito site was premature because
of the lack of urban services and because of the access difficulties.
This reason is the usual justification for timing ordinances, and has
not been widely accepted by the courts. The court decisions have in
part been concerned with the discrimination which results if pre-
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mature development is sought to be prevented without a compre-
hensive community plan.7 If the community can demonstrate that
its plans contemplate development of the property within a reason-
able period of time, courts should be more tolerant of local zoning
decisions designed to implement a timed development policy for valid
reasons. For example, decisions designed to coordinate development
with urban services or prevent the under-utilization of land should
be upheld.72
The second reason is more confusing and opaque. It appeared
that the staff was asserting the right to apply the public interest
standard in the Preamble to Section 20-42. A staff member explained
that while the site fell within the "broad and general framework of
the commission's land use plan,"73 the plan did not specify the final
location of any of the centers. This caused problems because the land
use categories for the surrounding land were designated without
specific regard to the possibility of a regional shopping center.7 4 He
71. Courts have been hostile to the argument that residential growth should be
deferred or excluded because it would be costly for the city or county to provide
adequate urban services. See National Land Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa.
504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) and Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper,
200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 389 (1959). But cf. Josephs v. Town of Clarkston, 24
Misc. 2d 366, 198 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1960). These cases are distinguishable
from this problem because they have involved attempts by small, middle and upper-
middle class residential communities to exclude lower income groups through
density controls. The cases should not be read to prevent a city which is in the
process of furnishing urban services such as highways and streets to an area to
defer development until the services are adequate providing it was done pursuant
to a reasonable community development plan. Cf. Provincial Development Co.
v. Webb, Cir. Ct. No. 7973, Fayette County, Kentucky (1961) which held that
the planning commission could divide the county into an urban and rural service
district and deny a map amendment for a subdivision proposal which would
encroach on the rural service district.
72. Courts will still continue to be hostile to land reservation decisions, if they
do not believe it is probable that the development projected in the plans will
occur. In Biske v. City of Troy the city refused to permit the third gasoline
station at an intersection because their master plan, which had not been adopted,
envisioned that the corner would be the business and professional center of the
city. The intermediate appellate court upheld the city in an opinion highly favor-
able to the use of comprehensive planning but was reversed by the Michigan
Supreme Court. The court was extremely skeptical that the development envisioned
by the city would occur and suggested that while a master plan might be used
to regulate development in a "vacant, virgin community," its validity in an
"improved and developed community" was doubtful. 381 Mich. 611, 166 N.W.2d
453 (1969) reversing 6 Mich. App. 546, 149 N.W.2d 899 (1967). The case again
illustrates the need for a scheme of regulation with compensation.
73. Hearing of April 27, 1967 at 15.
74. Id. at 15-19.
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explained that if the center were approved, changes in the land use
plan would have to be made to incorporate the center into the site.
Apparently the staff was arguing that approval of Shillito's would con-
stitute spot zoning. However, such an allegation is inconsistent with
the commission's adopted land use plan, which implies that a shop-
ping center at any one of the alternative sites would not be per s6
incompatible with the surrounding territory if proper steps, such as
good design and buffering, are used to harmonize it with surrounding
uses.
The core of the John Shillito presentation was devoted to attacking
the staff's first two recommended reasons for denial. Store executives
and plaintiffs testified that the site was chosen because it would be
at the intersection of major circumferential and radial thoroughfares. 5
These highways were not completed at the time of the hearing, but
correspondence with the Governor and the Department of Highways
was introduced to show that completion of the highways had high
priority.76
The John Shillito Company also announced their intention of
providing their own police and fire protection as well as sewage dis-
posal facilities. Their attorney argued that the proposed center was
consistent with the timing policy of the land use plan because it would
not be completed until 1972.77
Objectors argued that the Shillito site would constitute spot zoning
under decisions of the Kentucky Court of Appeals. Regional shopping
centers have always been vulnerable to the charge of spot zoning be-
cause they involve large tracts of vacant land on the fringe of the city
which are, and which will often continue to be, different from the
uses made of the surrounding area.78 A leading Kentucky case, not
cited and reversed on other grounds79 held that the rezoning of a
30-acre tract from residential to commercial uses, would constitute a
prima facie case of spot zoning. The Commission was not impressed
with the spot zoning argument.8 5 This attitude is consistent with that
75. Id. at 37.
76. Id. at 50-51.
77. Id. at 52-53.
78. See, e.g., MeNaughton v. Boeing, 68 Wash. 2d 659, 414 P.2d 778 (1966).
79. Pierson Trapp Co. v. Peak, 340 S.W.2d 456, 461 (Ky. 1960).
80. The attorney relied principally on Fritts v. City of Ashland, 348 S.W.2d
712 (Ky. 1961) and Hodge v. Luckett, 357 S.W.2d 303 (Ky. 1962). Fritts
invalidated the rezoning of a four acre tract in the midst of a stable residential
neighborhood from R-2 to light industrial for the sole reason that the owner of
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of recent cases from other jurisdictions, which have largely abandoned
the Euclidian fallacy that all non-residential uses are incompatible
with residential uses. Some of the cases simply do not discuss spot
rezoning in reviewing map amendments for regional shopping cen-
ters.91 Few have been as explicit as the Ohio Supreme Court, which
took the position that the rezoning of a tract as large as 80 acres could
not state a prima facie case for spot zoning.82 Several cases have even
approved the rezoning of large tracts on the fringe of the city for
regional shopping centers in the absence of a land use plan or similar
policy source, on the theory that there was a need for the center and
that the city must be given the right to provide for these needs in
advance of existence of the plan.83 Perhaps the courts are beginning
to presume that the performance standards increasingly contained in
planned shopping center ordinances can adequately harmonize the
shopping center with surrounding land uses.84 The Kentucky Court
of Appeal should have no difficulty sustaining the Lexington method
of allocating shopping center land against a charge of spot zoning
unless the aggrieved party can demonstrate that the criteria used by
the plan in selecting the alternative sites were arbitrary or irrational. 5
a factory threatened to leave the city if he could not build a factory on the site.
Hodge invalidated the rezoning of a low-lying 18/2 acre tract from residential
classification to light industrial finding that: "The reclassification in this case
is not part of an orderly and systematic scheme of planning, nor has there been
any change in the surrounding territory except that it has become more instead
of less residential in character." Id. at 305.
81. For a review of the early cases see Bartlett, Shopping Centers and Land
Use Controls, 35 NoTra D~xt LAWYER 184, 197-202 (1959).
82. Willett v. Village of Beachwood, 175 Ohio 557, 197 N.E.2d 201 (1964)
rev'g 119 Ohio App. 403, 188 N.E.2d 625 (1963) and aff'g 87 Ohio L. Abs. 143,
176 N.E.2d 337 (1961).
83. See Pressman v. City of Baltimore, 222 Md. 330, 160 A.2d 379 (1960).
Cf. Lanner v. Board of Appeal of Tewksbury, 348 Mass. 220, 202 N.E.2d 777
(1964).
84. Cf. Luery v. Zoning Board of Stamford, 150 Conn. Supp. 136, 187 A.2d
247 (1962). The court sustained the rezoning of a 34 acre tract for an industrial
park on the fringe of the city because it was in accordance with a comprehensive
plan and adjacent property owners would be protected by the buffering standards
contained in the ordinance.
85. The closest case to take this position is Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174
Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963). The court sustained the rezoning of a 103
acre tract for a regional shopping center and dismissed the argument that it
constituted spot zoning. See Cunningham Land Use Control-The State and
Local Programs, 50 IoWA L. Rav. 367, 397-399 (1965). See generally Platt,
Valid Spot Zoning: A Creative Tool for Flexibility of Land Use, 48 OnR. L. REv.
245 (1969).
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Because the Headley Estates site was not included in the land
use plan, their attorneys were forced to make a frontal attack on the
plan. Their first argument was that non-inclusion was irrelevant be-
cause they had an "understanding" that adoption of the land use plan
would not prejudice consideration of their petition.86 They also tried
to show that conditions in the area had changed since the preparation
of the plan and the previous denial of their petition in 1964. The
basic reasons for non-inclusion of the site were its close proximity to
the existing regional shopping center and poor access. The Headley
traffic expert based his case on the premise that most of the traffic
would not use the poor access routes.87 But under questioning by the
commissioners he did indicate that existing conditions were not good.
The director of the planning staff was questioned about the suitability
of the site for a shopping center,88 but he refused to state whether a
shopping center at that site would be in the best interest of the com-
munity. He did, however, state that the traffic situation at the inter-
section was "bad" and that the proposed development would make it
"worse."18 9
These arguments assume that the comprehensive plan is performing
its classic function. In Bettman's words: "It embodies the interrela-
tionships between different classes of public improvements, streets,
parks, riverfront structures, and locations of residential, business,
industrial, etc., areas, based on studies of need through a considerable
period of time."90 It is theoretically within the special competence of
the planning commission to assess arguments directed to this function
of the comprehensive plan. However, the most striking feature of
these hearings was the fact that the commission also attempted to
choose between the three competing applicants on the basis of which
shopping center would have the most beneficial impact on the over-
all development of the community. Neither the state enabling legisla-
tion, judicial decisions, nor the Lexington planned shopping center
ordinance furnished the Commission with criteria to make this kind
of decision. Having turned from a limited but manageable use of the
comprehensive plan to this broad conception, it is hardly surprising
86. Hearing of June 23, 1967 at 18.
87. Id. at 32-47.
88. Id. at 60-62.
89. Id. at 62-65.
90. A. BETTMAN, City and Regional Planning Papers, supra note 37 at 42.
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that the commissioners were subsequently unable to offer a rational
explanation for their decision.91
This line of inquiry is illustrated by the testimony of Dr. Homer
Hoyt, a nationally-known real estate expert, for the Lakeview proposal.
Hoyt argued that the Lakeview and Shillito sites served mutually
exclusive trade areas. This concept was based on the assumption that
shoppers approaching Lexington from the south and east on the
Interstate would stop at the Lakeview center but not at the Shillito
site because the Shillito site has no Interstate access. However, com-
pletion of the proposed bypass to the Shillito site would put it only
fifteen minutes from the Lakeview site. It is hard to believe that
shoppers outside the Lexington area would be put off by an additional
drive of fifteen minutes. This point was recognized, and Dr. Hoyt's
testimony largely discredited. 92
C. THE PROCESS OF COMMISSION DECISION: TME LAST TWO HEARINGS
Prior to the third hearing, on July 27, 1967, one of the Commission
members attempted to convince his fellow members to decide on one
of the three sites at an off-record meeting so that they could present
a unified front at the public hearing.93 He believed that the Lakeview
site was most consistent with the land use plan because of its superior
access and because it could be functionally related to the downtown
area. He hoped to persuade his fellow members to adopt a unit rule
and recommend this site, but they refused.
The third hearing opened with a request by one commissioner that
each petitioner agree to reduce his application to 40 acres because,
if they did not do so, approval of one petition would necessarily affect
disposition of the other two. 94 After some sharp discussion among
themselves to the effect that the whole purpose of the hearing was to
91. For an enlightening discussion of the analagous problem of television station
license renewals see Jaffe, WHDH: The FCC and Broadcasting License Renewals,
82 HARv. L. REv. 1693 (1969).
92. In response to a question from a Commission member Dr. Hoyt admitted
that no iron curtain separated the two potential market areas but contended that
Shillito's was farther away from the major secondary and tertiary trade area to
the east and thus Lakeview had the superior site. Hearing of April 27, 1967 at
131.
93. Interview with member of Lexington-Fayette County Planning Commis-
sion, March 21, 1968.
94. Transcript of Hearing, Lexington-Fayette County Planning Commission 2
(July 23, 1967) (Hereinafter referred to as Hearing of July 23).
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choose one site from among the three, the proposal was defeated.90
However, a few minutes later the same member announced he pre-
ferred "to vote right down the line for every one of them."90 This
illustrates that, after months of public hearings about the land use
plan, at least one member had great difficulty in reconciling its recom-
mendations with his personal economic value orientation. Following
this exchange, the attorney for the Headley Estates saw an opportunity
to win approval and orally attempted to amend his petition to 45.6
acres. He did not follow the Commission's established amendment
procedure nor did he specify which 45.6 acres he wished to have
zoned.97 This procedure apparently took the other attorneys by sur-
prise because they did not object. This was one of the pivotal points of
the hearing, for just before the voting on the Headley site one mem-
ber remarked that he felt "very good about the applicant" since it
had reduced its request from 80 to 45.6 acres.
Another commissioner moved to approve the Headley site on two
grounds: (1) that the character of the neighborhood had changed
since 1964 when the petition was first denied, and (2) that rezoning
for outsiders had been approved in the past so that it was time to
approve one for a local man.98 This argument also surprised the other
two applicants because they did not object to the motion, apparently
confident that it would be denied. After a brief discussion among the
commissioners the motion carried by a vote of five to three.99 The two
members holding a collective value orientation voted to deny approval
of the petition. Another commissioner immediately moved to deny
the petition of John Shillito on the grounds that the community was
now adequately served by regional shopping centers. Another stated
that since the commissioners had committed themselves to the land
use plan, more time was needed for rediscussion of the evidence; 00
another immediately moved to table the remaining two requests.101
This motion failed to carry and the commissioners began to debate
95. Id. at 17.
96. Id. at 21.
97. The attorney for Headley Estates conceded at a subsequent hearing that
they had made no formal request to amend their petition. Hearing of August 10,
1967.
98. Transcript of Hearing, Lexington-Fayette County Planning Commission,
20-21 (July 27, 1967).
99. Id. at 22.
100. Id. at 23.
101. Id.
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for the first time just what the legitimate purpose of zoning might be
in relation to the timing of commercial development. 102 After some
loose talk about not inhibiting competition and the ability of the free
market to avoid oversaturation, the motion to deny the Shillito peti-
tion was carried. A motion to deny the Lakeview petition carried
by a six to one vote-one member had previously stopped voting.
At this point the non-voting member observed that it was customary
to attach reasons for commission recommendations and challenged his
fellow members to come up with one good reason for their action.
The members began to discuss whether this custom was mandatory or
discretionary. As the hearing drew to a dose one member summed it
up when he told the secretary trying to take accurate minutes, "don't
try and say we were consistent today."'10
The Commission convened again on August 10, 1967 for a meeting
which was styled in their minutes as "Special Meeting for Reasons for
Regional Shopping Center Action." At this meeting, reasons for com-
mission action were advanced but not amplified, questions about the
legitimate function of the land use plan and the timing policy were
raised but not answered and numerous motions were made which
never came to a vote.
The chairman began by announcing that the Commission had not
in fact approved any regional shopping centers because the reduction
of the Headley Estates petition from 80 to 45.6 acres "eliminated its
consideration as a regional shopping center."'10 A little later in the
hearing another member questioned the validity of the oral amend-
ment, since Commission procedures did not permit oral amendment
to petitions. Also, neither the Commission members nor the director
of the planning could ascertain just which 45 acres out of the original
80 acres had been approved. The chairman summarily dismissed
102. Id. at 34.
103. Id. at 44.
104. Hearing of August 10, 1967 at 5. He also argued that a citizen of
long standing in the community should not be denied the right to develop his
property and that conditions had changed in the area since the petition was
denied in 1964. This argument was apparently an application of Ky. R v. STAT.
§ 100.213(2) (1969), which provides that a map amendment may be granted
if there have been "major changes of an economic, physical or social nature within
the area involved which were not anticipated in the community's comprehensive
plan and which have substantially altered the basic character of such area." The
land use plan had been adopted five months prior to the hearing and would seem
to be the appropriate comparison date rather than the time the last map amend-
ment for the property was denied. The member did not elaborate on the changes
which had occurred or when they had occurred.
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these objections, saying that the exact location of the center could be
worked out in the development plan. 05
This ended the explanation of the reasons for approving the Head-
ley petition and the Commission moved on to Shillito. One of the two
Commission members gave a lucid statement of the timing policy and
concluded that he had reasoned that if one petition had been ap-
proved, all others must be denied. He also justified his denial on the
necessity to protect the financial integrity of Lexington's urban re-
newal program. This point had been tangentially raised during the
hearings but was never fully discussed. Two major plans dealing with
the downtown-the Commercial Activities Analysis and a Design Plan
for Downtown' 0 -had been prepared. The Design Plan produced a
conventional model of a "core beautiful" but it did not lead to the
adoption of any radical implementation programs. A small urban
renewal program is currently underway but it is confined to removing
railroad tracks which parallel the main street, one block west, causing
frequent traffic jams, and rehabilitation of some adjacent buildings. 07
At this time it is doubtful that the program will produce more than
a few new parking lots and streets. There was no comprehensive
urban renewal program for the Commission to protect, and they wisely
did not choose to stress this argument although it might have more
merit, given a more effective program. The lack of a comprehensive
redevelopment program also casts considerable doubt on whether the
conditions specified for adoption of the timing policy have been ful-
filled.
105. Id. at 6-7.
106. City-County Planning Commission, Lexington-Fayette County, Ky. Design
Plan for Downtown Lexington, Ky.
107. Lexington's first urban renewal site was designated in mid-1965 and
approved by the Urban Renewal Administration in June, 1968. The site con-
tains 83 acres and forms a narrow rectangle through the core of the city. Thirty-
two acres will remain intact if the property owners are willing to bring their
buildings up to standards adopted by the urban renewal commission. Seventeen
acres will be available for new private developments and the remaining 34 acres
will be used for street widening. The Lexington and Fayette County Planning
Commission, The Lexington Downtown Plan 17 (1967). The major activity as of
late 1967 was the signing of a grant and loan contract with the federal govern-
ment for $5,717,722.00 to remove a section of the main line of the Chesapeake
and Ohio Railroad. A civic center for the site has been proposed but there has
been no agreement as to its location or content. City of Lexington, Progress
Report for 1966, 35-36 (1967). The rehabilitation project does not appear to be
successful, as a student pilot study of one block on Main Street indicated that
many established businesses are leaving the block rather than incurring the expense
of bringing their property up to commission standards.
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The Commission quickly passed on to Lakeview Estates, whose at-
torney moved that the Commission list the requirements for a regional
shopping center under the B-1P ordinance and explain how the
Headley petition met them while Lakeview's did not.' °8 The chair-
man moved that the Commission comply with these requests but one
commissioner objected because the staff would have had to stop all
work in order to comply with it. The attorney for John Shillito
offered to answer the questions for the Commission but the minutes
do not record the acceptance of his offer. The chairman decided to
withdraw his motion until "some decision could be reached on the
forwarding of the recommendation."' 0 9 Another member immediately
moved that the Commission invalidate all previous actions on the
three petitions.110 In response to this motion the chairman justified
his vote for the Headley site because the Commercial Activities Analy-
sis stated that a new regional shopping center would be needed by
1970 providing Sears stayed downtown. "He knew for a fact that
Sears studied our downtown area and tried to find a suitable location"
and since they could not find one "he would like to do everything he
could to get them a new store."'- Another commissioner then re-
minded him that the Commercial Activities Study had been general
and was not intended to single out any one business for special con-
sideration.mx
The motion to invalidate previous action was defeated by a five to
three vote. This triggered a long harangue by one commissioner
against the actions of his fellow members, the gist of which was about
the Commission's duty to follow their adopted land use plan. The
intensity of his remarks is suggested by the following excerpt:
I personally have reached the point where I can no longer say
that the Commission's actions are reasonable, logical, based only
on public knowledge, public facts and are something this com-
munity can be proud of."$
The other commissioners were rather stunned. One member mused
that perhaps the Commission was trying too hard to control the econ-
omy. He allowed that it was proper to exclude gas stations from resi-
dential neighborhoods, but if a firm was willing to invest $14 million
108. Hearing of August 10, 1967 at 8-9.
109. Id. at 23-24.
110. Id. at 48.
111. Id. at 48-49.
112. Id. at 50.
113. Id. at 63.
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in the community, it was not the function of the Commission to
prevent it.1"4 More discussion about the relationship between zon-
ing and the control of competition followed, but no conclusions were
reached. A motion to forward the Lakeview and Shillito petitions to
the local legislative bodies without approval of a preliminary develop-
ment plan failed. The attorney for Lakeview Estates renewed his re-
quest for a comparison of his petition with Headley's but shortly with-
drew it and asked that the Commission delay forwarding any recom-
mendations to the city council so that his client could consider filing
a petition for smaller acreage. This seemed to please everyone and was
carried unanimously along with a motion made by the attorney for
Shillito that the commission forward its recommendations to the
fiscal court based on whatever material the Commission had in their
files., 5 The hearing then dosed.
EPILOGUE
Few people were satisfied with the Commission's action. John Shil-
lito Company took its petition to the county fiscal court, which ap-
proved it. However, the petition was denied because both the Plan-
ning Commission and the fiscal court had to approve it. Shillito ap-
pealed the Planning Commission decision to the circuit court, but
before the case was heard the Commission reversed itself and approved
the petition after a rehearing on February 29, 1968. The fiscal court
approved it on March 6, 1968. The Lakeview Estates petition was sent
to the city Board of Commissioners pending a request to amend it.
The petition was amended to reduce the size of the total planned de-
velopment from 236.19 to 94 acres while the regional shopping center
site was reduced from 58 to 53.1 acres. The petition was approved by
the Planning Commission on January 25, 1968 and by the city Board
of Commissioners on February 27, 1968.116 Headley Estates was not
without its troubles, though the city Board of Commissioners con-
curred in the Commission recommendations. Adjoining neighbors
brought suit alleging that commission approval was inconsistent with
the comprehensive plan.
The circuit court invalidated the Headley map amendment.117
Relying on American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson
114. Id. at 68.
115. Id. at 72-102.
116. Letter from City-County Planning Commission to author, June 26, 1968.
117. Baker v. Lagrew, Cir. Ct. No. 21174, Fayette County, Kentucky (1968).
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County Planning and Zoning Comm.,"x8 the court framed the issue
as follows: "[W]as there substantial evidentiary support for the recited
findings of the city legislative body for the action of the Planning
and Zoning Commission?" The court held that a sufficient eviden-
tiary showing had not been made because adoption of the land use
plan precluded the city from locating a regional shopping center on
the Headley property unless the statutory requirements had been met.
The court then held that there had been no change of conditions
since the 1964 denial, and that there was no evidence that the recently-
adopted land use plan was in error. 1 9 The court distinguished Ward
v. Knippenberg, which had seemed to hold that the Commission did
not have to follow every detail of a land use plan:
This is not to say, however, that the basic schedule outlining
planning and zoning objectives in an extensive area can be com-
pletely ignored without findings based on substantial evidence
that the plan was in error in its applicability to the subject
property, or that conditions have changed since the actual land
use development, or otherwise.- o
The court's decision is narrow, holding only that the Commission
had not made the necessary evidentiary findings."2' However, the opin-
ion does upgrade the function of adopted community plans because of
the court's willingness to use them as a new standard for judicial
review. It reiterated the statement in American Beauty Homes that
there is "a presumption in favor of the original zoning plan,"' - but
it appears to have defined "plan" differently than the court did in
American Beauty Homes. That court relied on an earlier Kentucky
case-u which dearly considered the plan to be only the zoning map.
The Fayette circuit court seemed to treat the land use plan as an in-
tegral part of zoning.124
In February, 1968, the commissioners took steps to make their ac-
tions consistent with the land use plan by amending it. The timing
policy and the policy of pre-selecting a limited number of alternative
sites were abandoned because they did not allow for ".... a reasonable
118. 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964) (Hereinafter referred to as American Beauty
Homes).
119. Baker v. Lagrew at 6.
120. 416 S.W.2d 746 (Ky. 1967).
121. Baker v. Lagrew at 7.
122. 379 S.W.2d 450, 458 (Ky. 1964).
123. Scholoemer v. City of Louisville, 298 Ky. 286, 182 S.W.2d 782 (1944).
124. Baker v. Lagrew at 8.
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choice among other sites which might be set aside for future regional
shopping centers. By being too restrictive such sites might be pre-
empted for other uses and therefore might not be available for com-
mercial uses at some long range future date."' 5
CONCLUSION
This study indicates that enabling legislation requiring adoption
of community development use plans as a basis for regulation will
not insure rational decisions. The decisions of the Planning Com-
mission cannot be considered rational, if the term is defined as a
thorough and objective consideration of a series of proposed alterna-
tive choices according to the previously agreed upon criteria. The
initial choice of the non-included site was based on reasons which
sharply deviated from the criteria the previously adopted plans deemed
relevant. As a result, the Commission was unable to give adequate ex-
planations for their decisions. Decisions such as these impeded com-
munity acceptance of planning, breeding disrespect and cynicism of
the planning process. Planning is not viewed as a legitimate institution
to control land development. The decision-making process must be
improved. The need for improvement is especially critical since
broader grants of planning and regulatory authority are being dele-
gated to units of local government. If these delegations of discretion
are not accompanied by new standards of judicial control, the deci-
sions taken by the Lexington-Fayette County Planning Commission
suggest that increased opportunities for arbitrary and discriminatory
regulations will be created with little corresponding benefit to the
public.126
The first question that can be asked about the decisions reached is
whether the right people made them. Two important value orienta-
tions of the members appear to have been operative. The first is the
possibility that political corruption existed so that objective decision-
making was impossible. At an inquiry convened by the county judge
to investigate corruption in Lexington shortly after the hearings were
concluded, an attorney for John Shillito Company testified that he
was told by a local financier, allegedly able to control the commission,
that $35,000.00 would be necessary to secure a favorable recommenda-
125. Louisville Courier-Journal, July 27, 1968, at 1, col. 1.
126. See MAKIELSKE, Zoning: Legal Theory and Political Practice, 45 J. URBAN
LAw 1 (1967).
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tion for his client.127 No criminal charges have been filed but the
testimony indicates a factor which may always be present to interfere
with the public interest. However, a more fundamental value orien-
tation appears to have precluded acceptance of the plan by a majority
of members. Basically, they were unable to reconcile the economic
assumptions on which the plan was based with their own deeply en-
grained values. Their faith in the ability of the free market to achieve
an optimum allocation is an example of the individualistic bias which
characterizes the administration of American land use controls.12$
The continued existence of this value orientation suggests that pro-
fessionally prepared land use plans can only function as a basis for
local governmental decisions if they incorporate widely shared com-
munity values. Assuming that the functions of planning needs to be
expanded, the alternative is to re-allocate the decision-making au-
thority or re-educate lay participants.
Current reform proposals often assume that the decisions are being
made by the wrong persons. 9 To remedy this it has been suggested
that a city draw up a development code including detailed perform-
ance standards and then permit a professional planner to approve or
disapprove individual requests for development. Professor Reps in his
1964 Pomoroy Memorial Lecture proposed the use of more elaborate
community development plans which project future land uses and
which are accompanied by state-wide review by a professional admin-
istrative staff of all local decisions made by lay bodies.3po The Ken-
tucky planning statute requires the preparation of plans along the
lines envisioned by Reps but does not create a non-lay reviewing body
other than the judiciary. This study provides support for the argu-
ment that more professionally trained, and hence more "objective,"
reviewing bodies are needed. However, it is also possible that the
Lexington-Fayette County plans, prepared with the assistance of a
technical staff, could function more rationally if the conceptual rela-
tionship between the adopted plans and subsequent map amendments
and other regulations were made more precise.
A major justification for attaching legal consequences to the prep-
aration and adoption of community development plans is that they
127. Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 12, 1968, § B, at 3, col. 3.
128. Mandelker, The Role of Law in the Planning Process, 30 LAw & CoN-
Tzm . Po3. 26 (1965).
129. For a survey of current reform proposals see Note, Administrative Discre-
tion in Zoning, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 668 (1969).
130. Reps, supra note 44 at 62.
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will permit more sophisticated regulatory decisions to be made in a
non-discriminatory manner. 1 They can infuse more direction into
the vague statutory mandates that land use controls be enacted pur-
suant to the health, safety and general welfare of the community.
While the complex inter-relationships between land uses and their
impact on factors such as traffic flow and the economic and social de-
velopment of the community cannot yet be calculated with mathe-
matical precision, reliance on previously adopted plans should be able
to produce more rational land use patterns than are achieved under
the present process of largely ad hoc decisions. The time at which
community development plans are prepared and adopted is the most
appropriate time to consider these inter-relationships and resolve com-
peting claims for land allocation. It is at this stage that the impact
of various alternative use patterns on the development of the com-
munity can best be appraised.132
Under most existing judicial definitions of the comprehensive plan
there is only one crucial stage at which legislative or administrative
discretion is subject to review. This is the request for a map amend-
ment, variance or special exception. However, under the Kentucky
statutes and Reps's proposals there are now two crucial discretionary
stages subject to review: at the time the plan is adoped, and when it
is applied. At the first stage the planning unit must decide whether
to adopt a given development standard or allocate a given amount of
land for a projected use in preference to other uses. At the second
stage a particular request for development is evaluated in light of
earlier general decisions about the desired nature of community de-
velopment as expressed in the plan. The decisions which were the
subject of this study raise the question whether the amount of discre-
tion delegated to the planning commission or legislative body should
differ depending on which of the two stages of decision-making is
involved.
Greater discretion should be permitted when the plan is adopted
than when it is applied. At the time of adoption a number of alterna-
tive development policies should be considered and choices made from
them. The role of the judiciary-or any reviewing agency-should
131. Perin, The Noiseless Succession From the Comprehensive Plan, J.Am.Inst.
P. 336 (Sept. 1967).
132. This analysis assumes that there will be increased public participation at
the goal-formation stage of the planning process. This will, of course, be difficult
to achieve. See A. ALTSHULER, THE CITY PLANNING PROCESS 306-32 (1965).
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be to insure that policy choices were based on considerations con-
sistent with the permissible objectives of land use controls, and that
the decisions were reached consistent with concepts of procedural due
process. But having adopted the plan, the planning commission, local
legislative body or other decision-making body assumes a duty to fol-
low it. The function of the judiciary or other reviewing body is not
merely to insure that the decision was not arbitrary, but also that
it was consistent with the adopted plan.133 Decision-making units
should still be permitted wide discretion in applying the plan, but
they should be more restricted than in adopting the plan. Their de-
cisions should still be presumed reasonable, but they should have a
greater burden in justifying them.
Courts can limit the scope of delegated discretion by defining with
greater precision the reasoning process which a planning commission
must follow in applying a comprehensive plan.134 The decision
making unit should have a duty to submit a written statement. This
would require more than a conclusionary statement of reasons para-
phrasing the statutory standard. The courts can require that the
statement of reasons be factual rather than condusionary. This has
been done in several recent cases. 85 The statement of reasons should
demonstrate how and why the policies and land allocation projections
contained in the plans were applied to a particular tract. This study
indicates the need for such a requirement. At the fourth hearing some
members of the Commission were unclear about their duty to submit
reasons for their recommendations. This strongly suggests that they
did not consider that the plan imposed any constraints on them in
making their decision. If their duty to attach reasons had been clear
from the outset, one can speculate that the hearing might have been
confined to an application of the plan. The commissioners might
have felt that they were under a duty to choose one of the two sites
133. McBride and Babcock do not recommend that communities be required
to adopt a master plan, but if one is adopted, "it follows that this is a material
fact in any judicial determination of the reasonableness of that ordinance."
McBride & Babcock, The Master Plan-A Statutory Prerequisite To A Zoning
Ordinance?, 12 ZONING DIGEST 353, 358 (1960).
134. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, 595-623 (1965).
135. See, e.g., Blair v. Zoning Board of Appeals, City of Chicago, 84 Ill. App.
2d 159, 228 N.E.2d 555 (1967); Hunt v. Board of Appeals of Wilman, 227 N.E.2d
742 (Mass. 1967); Thomas v. Busch, 151 N.W.2d 391 (Mich. 1967) and Coderre
v. Zoning Board of Review of Pawtucket, 230 A.2d 247 (R.I. 1967). See Com-
ment, Judicial Control Over Zoning Boards of Appeal: Suggestions for Reform,
12 UCLA L. Rv. 937, 949-53 (1965).
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included in the plan, or to undertake a more complete inquiry into
the reasons why the Headley site was not included in the plan. They
could also try to determine if the "change or mistake rule" incor-
porated into Section 213 was applicable or if the plan should be
amended. In either case the plan would have had a greater role in
rationalizing the decision-making process than it did.
It has been suggested that a higher burden of proof should be placed
on an applicant seeking to invalidate a decision made pursuant to an
adopted plan.S However, I would urge that a greater burden be
placed on the city to justify its decision. This standard of judicial
review should be explicitly recognized as non-constitutional. That is,
it would not be enough for a local governmental unit to prove that
the decision was not confiscatory or discriminatory and that reasonable
minds could differ over its wisdom. A decision would still be pre-
sumed reasonable, but as a defense the applicant should be able to
prove that the city did not present evidence of substantial compliance
with the development policies and land allocation projections con-
tained in the plans. This standard would require courts to invalidate
decisions which had been formerly upheld under the debatable rule,
and thus property owners and developers would have greater pro-
tection from arbitrary decisions above that which now exists. Cor-
respondingly the public interest would be furthered because a greater
duty of loyalty to more objective standards would be encouraged.
This study also raises a more difficult question that courts and re-
viewing bodies must face if the adoption of a plan as a prerequisite
for land use regulation becomes mandatory. To what extent can and
should courts question the policy objectives incorporated into a plan?
Throughout the preparation of the plans adopted by Lexington and
Fayette County it was assumed that existing retail markets should be
protected by regulating the entry of new competition. The use of
zoning for this purpose is not free from doubt, as the planners were
apparently aware,1 37 yet no attempt was made by the lawyers or the
Commission until the final hearing to question the legitimacy of the
timing policy. The plan contained objectives which were of doubtful
legal validity and this seems, in part, to have been the reason it was
not accepted as a constraint on members of the Planning Commission.
136. Doeble, Horse Sense About Zoning and the Master Plan, 13 Zoning
DIGEST 209 (1961).
137. The 1962 interim land use plan referred to Mandelker, Control of Cor.
petition as a Proper Purpose in Zoning, 14 ZoNINo DIGEST 33 (1962).
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It is also arguable that the timing policy diverted the commissioners'
attention from the valuable design and location criteria incorporated
into the plan and rendered this criteria less influential than it should
have been.
The failure of the courts to define with more precision the per-
missible objectives of land use regulation frustrates the realization of
many desirable planning objectives. Some communities are reluctant
to undertake innovative land use regulations because of substantial
doubt over their validity. In others, the failure of courts to set more
precise guidelines encourages communities to experiment with reg-
ulatory techniques which become sophisticated tools of discrimination
and divert attention from the realization of modest but valid objec-
tives of land use regulation. The continued tension between plan-
ning objectives to further the general welfare of the community and
the existing judicial treatment of the scope of the zoning power is
nowhere better illustrated than in the confusion over the extent to
which communities can determine the demand for a particular use in
deciding whether to allow it in the community. The courts have
begun to formulate some rough guidelines, but their reasoning has
often become too mechanistic to allow planners and lay planning
bodies to distinguish between proper and improper uses of supply
and demand projections in making regulatory decisions. If these con-
siderations are to become an important element in the preparation
of community development plans, dearer judicial guidelines in this
area will be needed.
Many cases have adopted the rule that control of competition is not
a proper purpose of zoning. The origin of the rule seems to be Bas-
sett's dictum, "Neither can distribution of business be forced by
zoning ... it is not a proper field for zoning."138 Two cases are cited
for this statement but neither is based on this rationale.39 Among the
138. E. BAssETr, ZONING 53 (1940 ed.).
139. In Deerfield Realty Co. v. Hogue, 8 N.J. Misc. 637, 151 A. 373 (1930),
the city argued they could deny a permit for a gas station on the grounds that
there were already too many in the area. The court did not decide whether the
city could grant or deny a permit for a business in a particular locality depending
on whether it was in the best interest of the city to do so invalidated the city's
action because it was done pursuant to an interim ordinance. Two years had
elapsed since passage of a state zoning statute and the court considered the delay
in enacting a permanent ordinance an unreasonable interference with the right to
use property. Wiegen v. Board of Standards and Appeals, 229 App. Div. 320, 241
N.Y.S. 456, 173 N.E. 883 (1930), affirmed a decision by the Board of Standards to
reverse the Superintendent of Buildings who denied a permit for a garage on the
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reasons advanced by the recent cases are that control of competition
is ultra vires or unconstitutional, that it may not be the dominant pur-
pose for enacting the ordinance, and that businesses may not be li-
censed under the zoning power.140 Other cases have decided the sub-
stantive issue by holding that a person has no standing to contest a
zoning action if his only objection is that increased competition will
result from the new use.' 41 However, other cases, often dealing with
the control of gas stations, have said that control may be a factor in
zoning. 42 This latter position is tacitly approved by other jurisdic-
tions by characterizing the issue as something other than control of
competition. Courts will sustain the denial of map amendments for
shopping centers if the planning commissions have done so because
applicants did not show a sufficient demand for the new center. In
denying these amendments such courts will rely upon the rule that
the commission's decision will not be disturbed if reasonable men
could differ on the wisdom of their choice. 14 Often this reasoning
is coupled with the stern assertion that it is not the function of courts
to inquire into the motives of planning commission members. But
recent cases indicate that if the courts are convinced that a commis-
sion has used zoning for what they characterize as an improper pur-
pose, they will not hesitate to examine the record to determine the
ground there were too many in the back. The only reason given by the court for
affirming was general propositions that the courts should defer to the judgment
of administrative agencies.
140. Mandelker, Control of Competition as a Proper Purpose in Zoning, 14
ZONING DIGEST 33 (1962).
141. See Paolangeli v. Stevens, 19 App. Div. 2d 763, 241 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1963)
and cases cited therein.
142. See Mandelker, Control of Competition as a Proper Purpose in Zoning,
supra note 140 at 37. This Article will not attempt an analysis of these cases.
The city's ability to exclude gas stations from commercial areas is a function of its
ability to convince the court that the reasons are for protection of personal safety
rather than economic or aesthetic. Compare Hempturn Realty Corp. v. Larkin,
197 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 1959) with Glasser v. Larkin, 21 Misc. 2d 379, 198
N.Y.S.2d 257 (1960). See also Caudill v. Village of Milford, 10 Ohio Misc. 1,
225 N.E.2d 302 (1967).
143. Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Prince George
County, 233 Md. 186, 195 A.2d 723 (1963). A map amendment for a regional
shopping center along an arterial highway was granted in 1961. Two years later
a developer asked for a map amendment to develop another shopping center on a
35 acre adjacent tract. The amendment was granted over the recommendation of
the planning staff. The Maryland Supreme Court reversed holding that this was
not a proper case for application of the change or mistake rule stressing that no
evidence was introduced to show that the existing center was not adequate to meet
the current market demands.
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real reason for the action."' When regulations are based on adopted
plans and stated reasons the courts should feel less constrained in
scrutinizing the purposes of the regulation. They have been quite
properly reluctant to undertake an examination of legislative motives
when decisions were largely ad hoc. But if plans and statements of
reasons are required, it should be possible to determine the purpose
of the regulation with greater certainty, and the courts will not be in
the uncomfortable position of trying to second guess the reasons for
a legislative or administrative decision.
There are two types of situations which involve control of com-
petition. These have been characterized as questions of proximity
and market demand.145 While these two categorizations serve as a
useful analytical distinction, both questions are present in many cases.
In the first type of case an existing entrepreneur objects to a new
entrant not on the ground that the market is unable to absorb both
enterprises, but because his share of the market will be threatened.
The only issue is whether a pre-existing enterprise should be pro-
tected from new competition rather than whether the economy of
the community be served by controlling market entry. The second
type of case involves general welfare considerations. The argument
is that entrants must be regulated because the market cannot absorb
them. Existing entrepreneurs argue that failure to regulate will result
in severe economic dislocations in the community such as shrinkage
in the total job market, bankruptcies, and loss of property tax reve-
nues caused by the increase of unused or underutilized land. The
sophisticated protectionist may even argue that regulation of market
entry is merely preventing one decision maker from shifting external
costs to non-decision makers-the most traditional basis for public
regulation of land use.
Both questions were present in the three shopping center petitions.
The land use plan's recommendation that regional shopping centers
be located at least three to four miles apart was an attempt to protect
existing centers from competitors. A one-mile spacing requirement
was upheld by the New York Appellate Division in Shapiro v. Town
144. The most explicit rejection of the separation of powers argument is
Pearce v. Village of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 118 N.W.2d 659 (1962); see also
Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Davis, 200 Va. 316, 106 S.E.2d 152
(1957).
145. Mandelker, Control of Competition as a Proper Purpose in Zoning, supra
note 140 at 34.
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of Oyster Bay4 6 on the grounds that the policy of the municipality
was fairly debatable and that the restriction as applied was not a
taking. This result is consistent with the location criteria formulated
by urban real estate specialists. Gruen and Gruen, in Store Location
and Customer Behavior,'4 urge the developer to choose a site with
the least overlap with the market from which existing centers draw.
However desirable a spacing policy for a developer's private decision-
making, it may not be consistent with the equal protection clause.
Thus, Shapiro is wrong if the policy was based solely on the wisdom
of protecting existing centers.
The proximity cases raise the same equal protection objections
that are found in the "true" spot zoning cases. The municipality
has chosen to give preferential treatment to one individual or one
class of individuals to the detriment of another individual or class
of individuals with no corresponding benefit to the welfare of the
entire community.148 For example, in Fogg v. City of South Miami, 49
existing non-drive-in businesses succeeded in banning drive-in busi-
nesses from the downtown apparently for the sole purpose of forcing
people out of their cars in the hope that they would patronize exist-
ing merchants. The mistake was in not phrasing the ordinance in
more conventional terms such as control of traffic, noise, and preven-
tion of nuisances. The court invalidated the ordinance because "the
city made no showing that the prohibition against drive-in operations
had any relation to the health, morals, and general welfare" and "a
benefit or anticipated benefit to a special group within the City is
not enough."'i5 The dissenting judge, however, would have sustained
it under the "fairly debatable rule." Other cases which have invali-
dated protective zoning have relied on the proposition that zoning
for control of competition is not a proper purpose, but the equal
protection rationale underlies their decisions. This rationale applies
to the spacing policy of the Lexington-Fayette County land use plan
and should not therefore be a basis on which to premise zoning de-
cisons. This is, of course, not to say that the staff was incorrect in rec-
146. 27 Misc. 2d 844, 211 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1961), aff'd mem. 249 N.Y.S.2d 663.
147. C. GRUEN & N. GRUEN, STORE LOCATION AND CUSTOMER BEHAVIOR, A
BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO OPTI!MUMI STORE LOCATION, supra note 27.
148. See Spohrer v. Town of Oyster Bay, 219 N.Y.S.2d 376 (Sup. Ct. 1961)
and Marie's Launderette v. City of Newark, 35 N.J. Super. 94, 113 A.2d 190
(1955), rev'g 33 N.J. Super. 279, 110 A.2d 65 (1954).
149. 183 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1965).
150. Id. at 221.
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ommending disapproval of the Headley site, for it violated the plan's
location criteria on other valid grounds.
If the city argues that competition should be excluded because the
market cannot absorb the new entrants except at the expense of a
large segment of the existing business community, the cases are more
divided. If the issue is framed squarely in terms of control of com-
petition, the courts are likely to invalidate it. But if it is framed in
terms of protecting the welfare of the community, the court will
probably sustain it. The two contrasting attitudes are illustrated by
cases from Florida and Indiana. In Lachman v. City of Miami
Beach"' the city refused to rezone a tract of large private homes built
in the 1920's to permit the construction of high rise hotels. The city
reasoned ".... the construction of other new and modem hotels ...
would so reduce the patronage of those already in use that they would
become so needless and unpopular as to raise the danger of creating
a blighted area."152 The court noted that the city's lack of faith in
its ability to expand its tourist industry had "much to contradict or
offset it," but they sustained the refusal to rezone because the wisdom
of the policy was fairly debatable. The ordinance was not found un-
constitutional as applied even though the property was much more
valuable for resort hotels, because "This is a factor which must be
weighed against the public welfare or the effect on the community
at large." In Ratner v. City of Richmond,15 3 downtown merchants,
the owner of an existing shopping center, and adjoining property
owners joined to bring a class action against the city to protest re-
zoning for an additional shopping center. Their complaint was re-
markable for its candor:
If such shopping center or other commercial businesses are
constructed.., there would result an over-development and con-
centration of shopping centers, creating traffic congestion and
confusion in the area around the existing Shopping Center and
bringing about vacant and distressed retail store locations in the
downtown Richmond business section. . .. In addition, such per-
sons thus would be subjected to illegal competition and interfer-
ence with their established businesses resulting from the illegal
zoning of the property herein alleged. 54
151. 71 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1953). See also Chevron Oil Co. v. Beaver County,
22 Utah 2d 143, 449 P.2d 989 (1969).
152. 71 So. 2d at 152.
153. 136 Ind. App. 2d 578, 201 N.E.2d 49 (1964). See also Board of Zoning
Appeals v. Koeler, 244 Ind. 504, 194 N.E.2d 49 (1963).
154. 136 Ind. App. 2d at 582, 201 N.E.2d at 52.
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The court held "It is radiantly clear that this complaint fails to state
a cause of action sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of equity." The
court stressed that injury was problematical and that the projected
competition was not illegal just because it was new. Ratner can be
distinguished from Lachman because the latter involved a threat to
the economic stability of the city as a whole while the former involved
a threat to a limited group asking for special protection. In short, it
could be argued that Lachman is a true demand case while Ratner is
a proximity problem. However, this distinction is not valid since
both cases involved the same type of threat to a similarly situated
group of businesses and the projected adverse economic impact was
likely to be proportionately as great in both cities. The cases there-
fore reveal conflicting notions about the scope of the zoning power
and cannot be resolved by factual distinctions.
The question this study poses is whether the rapid development of
regional shopping centers is a sufficient threat to the economy of a
community so that their entry into the market may be timed to protect
established commercial enterprises from competition. The preamble
to Lexington's planned shopping center ordinance can be interpreted
as giving the planning commission, the city, and county the power to
license the centers on a public necessity standard. When the issue
has been squarely presented in this form, the courts have been hostile
to zoning authorities' assertion of a power analagous to licensing to
control the entry of new businesses into the community.'2 In a re-
cent Illinois decision, Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. County of
McHenry,15 6 a county asserted the right to deny a trailer park a
conditional use permit because it was incompatible with surrounding
uses and because there was no "public necessity for the conditional
155. A New Jersey case decided after the completion of this paper, Forte v.
Borough of Tenafly, 106 N.J. Super. 346, 255 A.2d 804 (1969) indicates that
courts are now becoming receptive to the use of planning to control market entry.
Tenafly, a decaying community in the northern part of the state, adopted a zoning
scheme designed to restrict new retail construction to the existing central business
district. Despite the fact that plaintiff's property was located in an area with a
number of nonconforming retail establishments, the supreme court held that
zoning could be used to revitalize downtown areas by excluding new retail con-
struction elsewhere in the community. "The fact that the ordinance may give the
central area a virtual monopoly over retail business does not invalidate it" be-
cause this was an incidental effect of an otherwise valid ordinance. Id. at 807.
While the decision will be welcomed by planners, the text discussion inra suggests
that the decision is wrong.
156. 41 Ill. 2d 77, 241 N.E.2d 454 (1968). See also Nani v. Zoning Board of
Review, 242 A.2d 403 (R.I. 1968).
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use." A master found that the applicant had complied with all of
the requirements of the ordinance except public necessity but that
the public necessity requirement was unconstitutional and ordered
the permit granted. The trial court agreed with his findings, but the
appellate court reversed, holding that "A special use is one which
carries with it a potential incompatibility with surrounding uses. It
should be justified, if at all, by a public need for the specific use at
the particular location."157 The Illinois Supreme Court reversed
although their reasoning leaves the power of the local governments
to inquire into the public necessity for a proposed use unclear:
We think that under the facts of this case, the appellate court
placed too great an emphasis on the plaintiff's failure to satisfy
this one standard of public necessity. . . .[W]hile lack of com-
munity need for a use sought to be established on a particular
parcel of real estate is relevant to the relative gain to the public,
this consideration is not in itself a conclusive or determinative
factor .... [A]t least where, as here, (1) there is no uniformity
of uses in the area, and the heterogeneous trial court determina-
tion that the proposed use would have no adverse effect on the
adjacent properties ... ; (2) the denial of the proposed use would
in no way benefit the public health, safety or morals; and (3)
there is substantial economic loss to the plaintiffs resulting from
such denial.15S
Pioneer Trust provides almost no guidance to planners except to
warn them against outright exclusion of a use. In attempting to
formulate a standard, Professor Daniel Mandelker has argued that
communities should have the right to consider supply and demand
projections in locating uses. His reasoning is that, given a comparative
scarcity of land in urban areas, private decisions do not make allow-
ances for the community's point of view. Thus, "the market cannot
be relied upon to make the most economic use of available sites.
The planner will have to make these decisions, and his solutions will
have an undeniable effect on competitive positions within the business
community. Nevertheless, secondary effects of competition are an
inevitable consequence of land use decisions predicted on land
scarcities. The courts should uphold these decisions if they are fairly
157. 89 I1. App. 2d 257, 267, 232 N.E.2d 816, 823 (1968), rev'd, 241 N.E.2d
454.
158. 41 Il. 2d at 71, 241 N.E.2d at 460.
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supportable .... ",59 He would not, however, affirm decisions intended
to discriminate in favor of one competitor over another.
I would agree that communities should have the power to prefer
one class of uses over another and to reserve land for this purpose.1 0
But, the Lexington experience raises the question whether the plan-
ning process can be trusted to produce decisions which result in a net
gain to the community rather than conferring monopoly status on
certain classes of uses of individuals. I would suggest that the timing
policy made it possible to define the general welfare to benefit narrow
segments of the community to the detriment of large, politically
powerless groups. The recommendations were used by the Commis-
sion to justify pre-existing value preferences for special groups and
individuals. There was little evidence that the plans considered the
actual impact of increased retail competition on the long-run economic
development of the city. Instead, they concentrated on protecting
existing merchants by minimizing the costs of short-run dislocations.
No effort was made to substantiate the vague references to the danger
of blight or the shrinkage of the property tax base. If courts are to
permit communities to consider supply and demand factors in plan-
ning and zoning, this study indicates that increased discretion must
be accompanied by more precise guidelines. If it is not, one of the
principal by-products of increased discretion will be to sanction more
subtle forms of exclusion to the detriment of a large segment of the
community, which will be denied the benefits of retail competition.
It may be useful to distinguish between the type of inquiry at-
tempted in a recent Michigan case, Biske v. City of Troy.P16 and the
one reflected in the timing policy. The city refused to permit a gas
station on a vacant comer in order to reserve the land for more
intensive future use. This decision was a projection that the economic
development of the community would require that certain classes
of uses be preferred to other less intensive uses. This is consistent
with the function of comprehensive planning, which seeks to determine
the optimum use of land within the community. If this is done
through the use of professionally prepared plans which are subject to
159. See Mandelker, Control of Competition As a Proper Purpose in Zoning,
supra note 140 at 41-42.
160. See Biske v. City of Troy, 6 Mich. App. 546, 149 N.W.2d 899 (1967),
re ld 381 Mich. 611, 166 N.W.2d 453 (1969) discussed supra note 72. See also
Bartlett, supra note 81 at 195.
161. Biske v. City of Troy, supra note 72.
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public review and modification prior to their adoption, Professor
Mandelker's argument that the anti-competitive consequences are
tolerable is valid and the regulation should be upheld. This is espe-
dally true if the plans are subject to modification by regional
authorities.
The Lexington-Fayette County Planning Commission made a differ-
ent kind of decision. They estimated the demand for one class of
services-retail goods-and asserted the right to decide how many
entrants should be allowed to serve this demand over a period of
time. The city was asserting that the use was analagous to a public
utility, as the planned shopping center ordinance suggested, and that
it was empowered to restrict market entry in the public interest.
There was no suggestion that the city had decided that other classes
of uses should be preferred to retail facilities. In this instance the
principal purpose of the planning policy was to protect existing
businesses at the expense of new competitors. This does not seem to
be a proper situation for application of the "fairly debatable rule"
because the individual property owner is subject to a high risk that
regulatory decisions will be arbitrary and discriminatory with little
corresponding gain to the public welfare. 162 I suggest that the courts
should continue to assume that the public interest is best served by
encouraging new services rather than protecting existing ones of the
same type.163 Thus, if the city alleges that a use should be excluded
because the existing economy could not absorb it without losses to
existing businesses and a detrimental impact on the over-all economy,
the city should have the burden of proving these allegations. They
should be able to discharge their burden only by showing that in
their planning process they had collected sufficient data to allow the
inference that the economy would suffer a net loss in terms of a long
run decrease in the amount of available jobs and a decrease in the
value of the property tax base. Otherwise, the court should presume
that the purpose of the city was to exclude competition and that the
exclusion is invalid. Of course, the city could deny a map amendment
for a given location if the use would be incompatible with its sur-
roundings or would have an adverse impact on traffic patterns.
In summary, it is hoped that this study will be useful to those
162. For a general discussion of the role of zoning in control of competition
see R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 70-79 (1965).
163. See Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM.
L. Rzv. 650 (1958).
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engaged in building a conceptual framework to integrate the use of
adopted land use plans with the administration of land use controls.
It has examined one attempt to use adopted plans for the allocation
of large tracts of undeveloped land and suggests that legislation which
requires the preparation and adoption of community development
plans is not enough to insure rational decision-making. New doctrines
of judicial review, dearer judicial guidelines, and perhaps new ad-
ministrative institutions must be created to insure compliance. Until
this is done the correlation between planning and the administration
of land use controls will remain intolerably imperfect.
APPENDIX A
The shopping center is a relatively recent and somewhat unique type of land
use development arising from changes in merchandising techniques and the in-
creased demand for off-street parking brought about by a rapid population growth
in the urban and suburban areas, and, as such, should rightly be considered in
terms of its over-all development and its effect upon a neighborhood and the com-
munity in general.
It is not intended, nor would it be proper, to forestall additional business zoning
simply to prevent competition, for it is not valid to consider the adequacy of
existing development unless the amount of existing development has some demon-
strable bearing on the health, safety, and general welfare of the community. The
primary consideration, rather, is assurance that additional commercial development
will subject neither the existing commercial development nor the tax base of the
community to the hazards of overdevelopment. Business is viewed as a service to
people in an area, and the privilege of providing this service is matched with the
obligation to do so, particularly since zoning by its very nature limits the number
and location of such business. The need for assurance of development of land for
business use, or at least assurance of the likelihood of development, thus becomes
self-evident for only by this means can we be assured that an excessive amount of
land will not be retained for commercial use but remain undeveloped, leaving an
area without shopping facilities, and that would-be developers are not at the mercy
of the owners of the only commercially zoned land in a given area. For these
reasons, the economics of shopping center location, design and development should
not be wholly within the province of private enterprise since there is a public
interest involved which must be considered. The proper approach is to consider
comprehensive community planning studies which indicate the approximate size
and location of shopping centers or commercial areas necessary to serve existing
and future populations involved and the proper timing of such development. Such
detailed studies will make it possible for the Planning Commission to accurately
determine how much additional business zoning is appropriate and justified at
the specific site and at the specific time in question.
The purpose of the planned shopping center district is to encourage the logical
and timely development of land for commercial purposes and the expansion of
existing shopping centers in accordance with the objectives and standards estab-
lished in the comprehensive plan. The protective standards contained in this
provision are intended to:
Assure convenience by providing commercial areas of sufficient size and in
the proper location to conveniently serve the people of the area in relation to
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their purchasing power and their needs and demands for goods and services.
Assure traffic safety and provide the improvement of major thoroughfare
traffic capacities by properly locating and grouping commercial areas and by
designing such commercial areas so as to provide safe and convenient access
thereto and adequate off-street parking for automotive vehicles and by effec-
tively separating vehicular from pedestrian traffic both within the commercial
area and on adjacent public rights-of-way.
Provide for service vehicles by including convenient access and loading
facilities in the design of commercial areas.
Protect adjacent residential neighborhoods from depreciation of property
values resulting from commercial overzoning and from the overdevelopment
or intrusion of undesirable commercial uses.
Promote community attractiveness by encouraging the design of commercial
areas which will integrate with residential areas by effectively utilizing topo-
graphic features, transitional areas, and the liberal application of landscaping
and screening devices, thus minimizing any adverse effect of any such com-
mercial area upon adjacent land uses and providing a pleasant environment
for the shopping and working experience.
Improve the economic base and tax structure of the Lexington metropolitan
area by encouraging the development of stable, economically sound commercial
concentrations.
Protect the investments of existing and future commercial concentrations
by providing the basis for convenient and stable commercial development
through the application of sound planning principles.
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